Cisco Unified Communications Manager WebDialer SSRF → Arbitrary File Write → Root (CVE-2026-20230)
by HalilDeniz · 2026-07-19
- Severity
- Critical (per Ciscos own Security Impact Rating, despite a High numeric CVSS)
- CVE
- CVE-2026-20230 (cisco-sa-cucm-ssrf-cXPnHcW)
- Category
- network
- Affected product
- Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM) and Unified CM Session Management Edition (SME) — WebDialer service
- Affected versions
- Per Cisco advisory cisco-sa-cucm-ssrf-cXPnHcW
- Disclosed
- 2026-07-19
- Patch status
- patched
Tags
References
Archive entry
intelseclab/poc-archiveMetadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date Added | 2026-07-19 |
| Last Updated | 2026-07-19 |
| Author / Researcher | HalilDeniz |
| CVE / Advisory | CVE-2026-20230 (cisco-sa-cucm-ssrf-cXPnHcW) |
| Category | network |
| Severity | Critical (per Ciscos own Security Impact Rating, despite a High numeric CVSS) |
| CVSS Score | 8.6 (CVSS 3.1, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N) |
| Status | PoC — scanner/tester confirms the WebDialer precondition and SSRF reachability |
| Tags | cisco, unified-communications-manager, ucm, webdialer, ssrf, cwe-918, unauthenticated, remote, privilege-escalation, kev, actively-exploited |
| Related | N/A |
Affected Target
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Software / System | Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM) and Unified CM Session Management Edition (SME) — WebDialer service |
| Versions Affected | Per Cisco advisory cisco-sa-cucm-ssrf-cXPnHcW |
| Language / Platform | Cisco UCM appliance, attacked via crafted HTTP requests to the WebDialer service |
| Authentication Required | No |
| Network Access Required | Yes — WebDialer service must be enabled (disabled by default) |
Summary
Cisco Unified Communications Manager’s WebDialer service, when enabled, contains an improper-input-validation flaw that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks by sending crafted HTTP requests. Successful exploitation allows writing files to the underlying operating system, which can subsequently be leveraged to elevate privileges to root — hence Cisco assigning this a Security Impact Rating of Critical despite the numeric CVSS score landing in the High band. Exploitation strictly requires the WebDialer service to be enabled, which is not the default configuration.
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
Tracked as CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery). Cisco’s advisory describes improper input validation for specific HTTP requests to the WebDialer service, allowing an attacker to cause the server to make requests to unintended locations and, from there, write files to the underlying OS — a primitive that can be chained toward root privilege escalation.
Attack Vector
- Confirm the WebDialer service is enabled and reachable — probe documented WebDialer paths (
/webdialer/Webdialer,/webdialer/Cisco_WebDialer_Service) and the CCM admin interface for fingerprinting markers. - Send a crafted HTTP request exploiting the SSRF flaw in WebDialer’s request handling.
- Use the resulting SSRF primitive to write a file to the underlying operating system.
- Leverage the written file to escalate privileges to root, per Cisco’s advisory.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access to a Unified CM deployment running WebDialer can achieve arbitrary file write on the underlying OS and escalate to root — a complete compromise of the call-manager appliance, with follow-on impact to the entire VoIP/UC environment it controls.
Environment / Lab Setup
Target: Cisco Unified Communications Manager / Unified CM SME with the
WebDialer service enabled (not default)
Attacker: Python 3 + requests + colorama
Setup Steps
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Proof of Concept
See
cve-2026-20230-scanner.pyin this folder — mirrored from HalilDeniz/CVE-2026-20230-Scanner, by a known, prolific security researcher. Verified before ingestion: read the script in full — it correctly gates exploitation on confirming the WebDialer service is actually enabled (probing/webdialer/Webdialer,/webdialer/Cisco_WebDialer_Service, and CCM admin fingerprint markers) before attempting anything further, matching Cisco’s own advisory note that WebDialer is disabled by default and required for exploitability. No obfuscation, no unrelated network calls.
Step-by-Step Reproduction
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The scanner first checks whether WebDialer is enabled and reachable, then proceeds with the SSRF-based test against the target.
Exploit Code
| |
Expected Output
[*] Checking WebDialer service...
[+] WebDialer likely enabled: https://target.example.com/webdialer/Webdialer (Status: 200)
[*] Scanning target: https://target.example.com
...
Detection & Indicators of Compromise
Remediation
| Action | Detail |
|---|---|
| Patch | Apply Cisco’s fix per advisory cisco-sa-cucm-ssrf-cXPnHcW. |
| Workaround | Disable the WebDialer service if not required (it is disabled by default; ensure it hasn’t been enabled unnecessarily). Restrict network access to Unified CM management interfaces to trusted administrative hosts only. |
| Incident response if already compromised | Treat as full appliance compromise given the documented root-privesc path; rebuild from a known-clean image and rotate all credentials the appliance had access to. |
References
- Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-cucm-ssrf-cXPnHcW
- CISA KEV catalog entry
- Public PoC — HalilDeniz/CVE-2026-20230-Scanner
Notes
Surfaced via a 30-day CVE discovery sweep on 2026-07-19, anchored on CISA KEV’s dateAdded field (added 2026-06-25). Verified before ingestion per this archive’s standing rule: read the full script and confirmed its WebDialer-enabled precondition check matches Cisco’s own advisory precisely.
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